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I. Introduction
Since October 30, 2006, blender manufacturer and seller
Blendtec has advertised its products on the internet by positing a
largely rhetorical question: Will It Blend? 1 The premise is
ingeniously (and humorously) simple: Blendtec founder and CEO
Tom Dickson shows firsthand the power of his company’s
blenders by blending unconventional items, from toy cars 2 to cans
of soup. 3 In a 2014 episode, the featured item was a brand new
iPhone 6 Plus. 4 The video proved popular, 5 but reactions,
unsurprisingly, were mixed. Some skeptics remained
1. See Christian Briggs, BlendTec Will It Blend? Viral Video Case Study,
SOCIALENS
(Jan.
2009),
http://www.socialens.com/wp-content/uploads/
2009/04/20090127_case_blendtec11.pdf (“In 2006, Blendtec’s relatively new
Director of Marketing launched a viral video campaign in which the company’s
CEO blended up various non-food items in Blendtec blenders.”).
2. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – Toy Cars, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNbzmdYRRmg (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – Cup of Soup, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2006),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OmpnfL5PCw (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – iPhone 6 Plus, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBUJcD6Ws6s (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. As of January 28, 2017, the video had 5,566,676 views. Id.
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unconvinced that the blended iPhone was real, 6 some appreciated
the humor, 7 and some expressed, with varying degrees of clarity,
outrage at the sight of Mr. Dickson quite literally reducing a
piece of technology worth hundreds of dollars to dust. 8 Of course,
these responses were largely visceral. They are, however, fairly
representative of the intellectual climate surrounding the
property right underlying Blendtec’s attempt to promote its
products: the much-maligned right to destroy. 9
Though traditionally recognized as a fundamental property
right, 10 the right to destroy has in recent decades come under
attack. 11 Congress has restricted the right with respect to artistic
creations, 12 courts have carved out several public policy
exceptions to the exercise of the right, 13 and some commentators
have called for either its partial or total abrogation, primarily on
the basis of waste. 14 The right has few defenders; to the extent it
6. One YouTube user, “Maria Ammerlaan,” commented: “You can clearly
tell the iphone is a fake.” Id.
7. For instance, a YouTube user going by the handle “Ds Vic” considered
the video the “[b]est thing [he’d] seen this year,” adding: “LOL.” Id.
8. “CocoCheryl GT,” for example, asked: “why watse a perfectly good
iphone???? i wuld be playing instead of crushing it. stop. nov body thinks this is
entertainment. its just a waste of time and money [sic]!!!” Id. “Carter Stanley,”
however, had a milder reaction: “I love your videos. I just get kinda angry when
u blend really expensive stuff [sic].” Id.
9. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE
L.J. 781 (2005) (discussing arguments against and justifications for the right to
destroy).
10. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 1.03(B)(5)
(2012) [hereinafter SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY] (including the right
to destroy among the “bundle of rights” afforded by property law).
11. See infra Part II.C (discussing actual and proposed limits on the right
to destroy).
12. See Visual Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting “the
author of a work of visual art . . . the right . . . to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work”).
13. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., N.A., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217–
18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to enforce a will providing that the testator’s
home would be destroyed upon her death).
14. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76, 77 (Stephen
R. Munzer ed., 2001) (arguing “against the continuance of the” right to destroy
on the ground that it does not mesh with Anglo-American values); Kellen Zale,
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is not challenged the right to destroy has been largely forgotten,
sparsely receiving scholarly attention. 15 Even Black’s Law
Dictionary has seemingly swept the right to destroy under the
rug. 16
This treatment might make some sense within the realm of
tangible property, especially real property, the context in which
the right is usually challenged. 17 After all, why should we, as a
society of finite resources, tolerate the destruction of some of
these resources at the whim of their owners? But property
evolves. What was once physical can now be digital. 18 And digital
property, though once primarily stored on local memory drives, is
now often stored on “the cloud”—that is, on servers maintained
by third-parties—meaning that they can be accessed through any
device with internet connectivity. 19 When it comes to such

The Government’s Right to Destroy, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 316–17 (2015)
(concluding that the government ought to have a broader right to destroy than
private citizens).
15. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (noting that “few scholars devoted
much attention to the right to destroy” compared to “the right to exclude, the
right to alienate, the right to use, the right to testamentary disposition, the
right to mortgage, and the like”).
16. See Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “owner”
as one “who has the right to possess, use, and convey something”). Prior to the
1999 seventh edition, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “owner” more broadly to
include the “right to enjoy and do with [his property] as he pleases, even to spoil
or destroy it, as far as the law permits.” Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783
(quoting Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
17. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 796 (“[T]he most prominent set of
cases prompting concerns about waste involve efforts by landowners to destroy
their homes via will.”).
18. See, e.g., RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not
Apply to Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 31, 32 n.1 (2007)
(defining “digital property” as the “digital data contained on computers and
other electronic storage devices”).
19. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
OF
STANDARDS
AND
TECHNOLOGY
2
(2011),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy
/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf
(noting that one of the “essential characteristics” of cloud-maintained data is
that it can be “accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use
by . . . mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations”).
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property, the problem is not ensuring preservation but confirming
destruction. 20
Storing our files—videos, songs, games, and documents—on
the cloud offers unprecedented convenience. 21 Convenience,
however, has its costs. The rapid adoption of cloud-based storage
services threatens two related but distinct aspects of property
ownership: control and peace of mind. 22 The right to destroy once
arguably served to protect these interests: it (1) allowed the
property owner to have exclusive say in the ultimate fate of her
property and (2) gave the property owner complete certainty that
no other would, or could, use the property. 23 By contrast, in the
world of the cloud, control is shared with a third-party24 and
certainty is displaced by faith. 25
20. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the resiliency of electronic data).
21. See DARREN QUICK ET AL., CLOUD STORAGE FORENSICS 1–2 (2013)
(discussing the “marked increase in the adoption of cloud computing”); Kevin
McGillivray, Conflicts in the Cloud: Contracts and Compliance with Data
Protection Law in the EU, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 217, 218 (2014)
(“Cloud computing allows businesses, governments, and consumers to outsource
their computing needs in an efficient and cost-effective manner.”). Indeed, this
very Note has been stored on Google Drive throughout the entire writing
process.
22. See, e.g., JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE
NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter FAIRFIELD, OWNED]
(manuscript at 9) (on file with author) (“We recognize instinctively that property
represents our ability to control the world around us.”); Richard A. Posner,
Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classical Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 664
(2004) (discussing the view of equating “the right to own property” with “the
right, in effect, to own one’s body and one’s peace of mind”); see also infra Part
IV (discussing how these problems arise in the context of cloud-maintained
digital property).
23. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794–95 (discussing the justifications
for recognizing the right to destroy and noting that “we might understand the
right to destroy as an extreme right to control subsequent alienation”).
24. See McGillivray, supra note 21, at 220 (noting that cloud users store
data “on servers over which they have little or no control”).
25. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CLOUD COMPUTING
SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST PRACTICES FROM A CONSUMER
FEDERATION OF THE US RETREAT ON CLOUD COMPUTING 9 (2010),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Cloud-report-2010.pdf (“A 2008 Pew Internet
& American Life Project report elucidated consumers’ biggest concerns about
cloud services . . . . Sixty‐three percent would be very concerned if the cloud
provider kept files after the consumer attempted to delete them.”).
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Perhaps a hypothetical would help to illustrate the point. In
1975, a photographer displeased with her photograph need only
burn it to exercise her right to destroy. She could see and smell
and sift through the ashes, and know that her right to destroy
had been successfully exercised. In 2000, a photographer
displeased with her digital image need only delete the file and
overwrite the storage device (or, for 100% certainty, smash it into
pieces). 26 She too could confirm the success of her destructive act.
Will this pattern hold for the year 2025? 27 Probably not, because
the owner of digital property maintained on the cloud will be able
to use only whatever deletion mechanism her cloud storage
service provides and hope that her wishes are fulfilled. 28 It may
appear to her that the file has disappeared, as commanded. 29 She
cannot, however, be sure that it is gone. 30 After all, the cloud
storage provider may be secretly keeping the file for itself. 31 Or
26. See Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, 89 A.B.A. J. 42, 46 (2003)
(discussing programs used for “destroying data”). According to an expert, “[t]he
only way to completely erase a hard drive is to take it out of the computer and
smash it with a hammer.” Id.
27. Of course, we do not know what the year 2025 will hold, but “[m]any in
the tech industry see the cloud as the definitive future of digital storage.” Alen
Peacock, What Cloud Storage’s Changing Forecast Means for Your Data, FORBES
(June 4, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2015/06/04/what-cloudstorages-changing-forecast-means-for-your-data (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Computing: Cloud
Control: Copyright, Global Memes and Privacy, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 53, 79 (2012) (noting that it is “up to the user . . . to trust that the
provider will delete her information”); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234 (“Once
information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible,
to control, track, or delete.”).
29. See, e.g., Delete Files in Dropbox, DROPBOX HELP CTR.,
http://www.dropbox.com/en/help/40 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (instructing users
how to delete their files stored on Dropbox’s servers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the uncertainty facing users of cloud
services).
31. Returning to Dropbox, its terms of service contain the following
provision:
We’ll retain information you store on our Services for as long as we
need it to provide you the Services. If you delete your account, we’ll
also delete this information. But please note: (1) there might be some
latency in deleting this information from our servers and back-up
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perhaps the digital property exists elsewhere, in one form or
another. 32 The bottom line is that the peace of mind once
generated by the inherent finality of an act protected by the right
to destroy is absent—lost, as it were, in the clouds. 33
This Note argues that the increasing prevalence of cloud
computing provides a new context for reexamining, and a new
justification for reaffirming, the right to destroy. 34 Part II
discusses the origin and development of the right to destroy and
the current state of the right within American property law’s
“bundle of rights.” 35 Part III begins with an overview of digital
property generally and then examines in more detail the nature
of cloud computing, specifically cloud storage. 36 Part IV explains
why the inability to delete cloud-maintained data is a problem. 37
Finally, Part V answers some of the criticisms levied at the right
to destroy by showing their inapplicability to digital property and
describes this Note’s suggested approach to reclaiming the right
to destroy in the world of the cloud. 38
storage; and (2) we may retain this information if necessary to comply
with our legal obligations, resolve disputes, or enforce our
agreements.
Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/privacy (last updated
Oct. 3, 2016) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 71 (“While information
stored on a personal computer is at risk and evanescent, once firmly rooted in
the Cloud, information is much harder to delete.”).
33. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (discussing the
underlying benefits of the right to destroy and the threat the cloud storage
model poses to these benefits).
34. For an excellent defense (and one of the few exhaustive treatments) of
the right to destroy in a more traditional context, see generally Strahilevitz,
supra note 9.
35. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the history of the right to
destroy, its development in the case law, and its treatment by scholars).
36. See infra Part III (discussing competing definitions of digital property
and cloud computing and why people began using cloud storage services).
37. See infra Part IV (arguing that the cloud storage model interferes with
a property owner’s control over her property and thereby diminishes the peace
of mind property rights have traditionally provided to owners).
38. See infra Part V (providing both a theoretical and practical solution to
maintaining control over digital property stored in the cloud).
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II. The Origin and Development of the Right to Destroy
A. Ancient Roots

The right to destroy cannot be found in any modern code or
constitution; it is instead “implicitly recognized in all legal
systems.” 39 This was not always so. Millennia ago, the law of
Ancient Rome expressly provided property owners with very
broad rights: “jus utendi fruendi abutendi.” 40 In English, this
phrase encompasses “the rights to use the [property,] . . . to use
the income generated by the property, or to completely consume
and destroy the property.” 41 It is thus within this absolutist view
of property ownership that the right to destroy finds its roots. 42
The Romans probably did not have any special preference for
destruction. 43 The most likely explanation for the jus abutendi is
that it necessarily justified “lesser” property rights. 44 In other
words, if an owner had the right to destroy her property, it
followed that the owner had the right to use, sell, give, devise, or
exclude that property from other persons. 45 This makes a great
deal of sense. The right to destroy probably was, as it seems

39. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 293 (2014)
[hereinafter SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW].
40. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 13 CALIF. L.
REV. 207, 209 (1925) (noting that a Roman had the right “of completely
consuming [his property] and therefore ending its effective existence”);
Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787–88 (discussing the origins of the right to
destroy in Roman law).
43. Indeed, although Roman law generally recognized the right to destroy,
it limited the right in certain classes of property: “slaves and land.” Radin, supra
note 42, at 210.
44. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785 (noting that “the right to
destroy . . . served the important function of demarcating the boundaries of an
owner’s rights in property”).
45. See id. at 788 (“A few early American courts picked up the notion of the
jus abutendi and . . . suggested that if a landowner had the right to destroy
property, he certainly had the right to use or dispose of it in a less dramatic
manner.”).

DISPERSING THE CLOUD

475

today, largely symbolic. 46 A property owner does not typically
desire to actually destroy her valuable property. 47
This characteristic, however, does not diminish the
importance of, or the need for, the right to destroy. The jus
abutendi provided security to Roman property owners,
guaranteeing to them that they, and no other, had control over
their property, that the ultimate fate of the property was in their
hands. 48 Although Anglo-American concepts of property and
property ownership have certainly changed since the time of the
Roman Empire, 49 this principle underlying Roman law’s
recognition of the right to destroy is just as relevant today as it
was millennia ago. 50

46. See Radin, supra note 42, at 210 (observing that “it may be seen that
the [j]us utendi fruendi abutendi, by virtue of its climactic arrangement, is
rather an analysis of the idea of ownership than a real statement of what the
elements of Roman dominium actually were” (emphasis added)).
47. As to why this is the case, Professor Strahilevitz succinctly articulates
the obvious: “A new homeowner is more likely to want to exclude outsiders from
his home than he is to want to raze it.” Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794. On the
other hand, property that we routinely destroy is typically disposed of without
controversy. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293–94
(2014) (noting that many “things subject to ownership will be destroyed as part
of a consumptive process that benefits their owners”).
48. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (viewing the right to destroy as an
“extreme exercise of some of the more widely recognized sticks in the bundle of
rights”).
49. For instance, Roman law knew nothing of intellectual property. See
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 710 (2002) (“Legal protection of inventions (or, for that matter,
other categories of intellectual property) simply did not exist in Roman or
Hellenistic law.”). Moreover, only certain classes of people in Ancient Rome were
capable of owning property. See, e.g., A. H. F. Lefroy, Rome and Law, 20 HARV.
L. REV. 606, 609 (1907) (noting that “all the members of the family being left
under the despotic control of the head of the family, [they were] . . . incapable of
acquiring or owning property in their own right and on their own behalf”).
50. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the relationship between property
rights and control over property).
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B. At Common Law

As with much of our jurisprudence, 51 American property
law’s counterpart to the jus abutendi—the right to destroy—
descends from the common law of England. 52 If one were to rely
solely on the writings of the famous English jurist Sir William
Blackstone, 53 one might conclude that English common law
enshrined property rights above all others. To him, the “right of
property” was “that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 54
Like the Romans before him, Blackstone viewed property
rights as absolute. 55 It is therefore not surprising that Blackstone
(and English law) recognized the right to destroy. 56 This is most
obvious in Blackstone’s discussion of the crime of arson, where
the right to destroy is implicitly recognized. 57 In his fervent way
51. See, e.g., ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL
CRIMINAL CASES, AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGES AND PROMISSORY
NOTES vii (1810) (“[O]ur progenitors brought [the common law] with them from
England, and made it, by adoption, their own, as much as the language they
spoke.”).
52. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787–91 (tracing the history of the
right to destroy from Rome to England and finally to the United States).
53. See generally Sir William Blackstone, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Apr.
7, 2008), http://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Blackstone (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017) (providing a biography of William Blackstone) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
55. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35 (“So great
moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community.”). The evidence suggests his writings were representative of English
common law. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that
“Blackstone’s Commentaries were widely studied as a summary of English law”).
56. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223–24 (explaining that “if
a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit whatever waste
his own indiscretion may prompt to, without being impeachable or accountable
for it to any one”).
57. See, e.g., Paul Jr. Sadler, The Crime of Arson, 41 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 290, 291 (1950) (discussing the connection between an owner’s
right to destroy her property and the restriction of arson to the malicious
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of speaking, Blackstone decried the crime as “an offense of very
great malignity, and much more pernicious to the public than
simple theft.” 58 Yet he acknowledged that a property owner was
entirely free to burn down her own house, subject to limited
exceptions. 59
Likewise, American common law tended to view property
ownership in absolute terms. 60 For instance, the first edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary, published in the late nineteenth
century, defined property as “the unrestricted and exclusive
right to a thing.” 61 Although disputes regarding the right to
destroy are relatively uncommon, 62 a few early American cases
discussed and recognized the right. 63 Courts implicitly
recognized the right to destroy in the arson context, 64 mirroring
England’s treatment of the crime. 65 More directly, the court in
United States v. Vanranst 66 explained that an “owner
might destroy his own property himself, or cause it to be done,
without committing an offence.” 67 Another court, in Kingsbury v.
burning of “the dwelling of another”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788 (“The
common law’s purported embrace of the jus abutendi is more precisely indicated
in Blackstone’s discussion of arson.”).
58. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220.
59. See id. at *221–22 (noting that, “if no mischief is done but to one’s own
[property], it does not amount to felony,” unless the owner-arsonist is leasing
the property to a tenant).
60. See, e.g., Daniel Raymond, Law Reform in Regard to Real Estate, 3 W.
L.J. 385, 390 (1846) (acknowledging “that a man’s right to property, to which he
has acquired a legal title, is absolute and unqualified”).
61. Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (emphasis added).
62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining why there are so
few cases challenging the right to destroy compared to other property rights).
63. See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (discussing cases
invoking the right to destroy).
64. See, e.g., Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. 320, 325 (Mass. 1824) (finding that
destroying one’s property by fire, “unaccompanied by an injury to, or by a design
to injure, some other person, is [not] criminal”).
65. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing Blackstone’s
views on the crime of arson at English common law).
66. 28 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.D. Pa. 1812) (concerning the destruction of a
shipping vessel).
67. Id.
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Whitaker, 68 invoked the right to destroy to uphold the validity of
a will. 69
By the twentieth century, the right to destroy seemed firmly
entrenched as a “stick” in the “bundle of rights” that came to
define property ownership. 70 American courts continued to state
that a person could not be convicted of arson merely for burning
down her own property 71 and invoked the right to destroy in
other various contexts. 72 Scholars, moreover, routinely listed the
right to destroy as a fundamental incident of ownership. 73 Indeed,
Black’s Law Dictionary included among the rights of a property
owner the right “to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law
permits,” 74 at least until 1999. 75 As Professor Strahilevitz noted,
this revision was “neither an accident nor an outlier.” 76 The next
subpart explores why that is so.
68. 32 La. Ann. 1055 (La. 1880).
69. See id. at 1062 (noting that a property owner “may destroy and
annihilate that which belongs to him,” and thus questioning “why” a testator
“should not have the right of determining its disposition after his death”).
70. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2008) (discussing property rights
through the bundle of sticks metaphor); UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note
10, at § 1.03(B) (same).
71. See, e.g., Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1942)
(recognizing “that common law offenses against private property such as
burglary, larceny, arson, and malicious mischief [do] not apply to an owner
dealing with his own property”); Jones v. State, 70 N.E. 952, 953 (Ohio 1904)
(acknowledging that Ohio’s arson statute “did not make it an offense to burn
one’s own building”).
72. See, e.g., Cass v. Home Tobacco Warehouse Co., 223 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Ky. 1949) (denying punitive damages because defendants “thought they had the
right to destroy the building” because they believed they owned the property
and thus “their acts were not malicious or wanton”).
73. See, e.g., George H. Weinmann, A Survey of the Law Concerning Dead
Bodies, in 73 BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 21 (1929) (listing
the right to destroy among other “important incidents of ownership”); J.E.
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture Of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 741
(1996) (including the right to destroy in the “bundle of rights”); Roscoe Pound,
The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939)
(recognizing the right to destroy as one of six property rights).
74. Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1990).
75. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (observing that the seventh
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary removed any reference to the right to destroy).
76. Id. at 784.
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C. Limitations of the Right
The right to destroy occupied a strange place in AngloAmerican law because it was implicitly recognized but rarely
acknowledged. 77 Then, in the late twentieth century and up to the
present, courts and commentators began to reexamine the right
to destroy. 78 To one degree or another, these new appraisals
tended to advocate limitations on the right. 79
1. Caselaw Exceptions
Although courts rarely adjudicate the question, 80 there are
some instances in which they have curtailed the right to
destroy. 81 Many courts have refused to enforce provisions in wills
calling for the destruction of the testator’s real property. 82 Of this
line of cases, Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. 83 is probably the
most famous. 84 Judge Rendlen, writing for the Missouri Court of
77. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293 (“Despite
its fundamental nature, the right to destroy is rarely made explicit in municipal
law.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787 (“The right to destroy evidently
received more attention in antiquity than it does today.”).
78. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784 (discussing late-twentieth century
cases examining the right to destroy); id. at 794 (noting that “few scholars had
devoted much attention to the right to destroy” prior to the publication of two
works in 1999 and 2001).
79. See id. at 786 (“In the twentieth century, the right to destroy fell out of
favor, and the most recent literature has argued that such a right, if it exists at
all, should be substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds.”). Professor
Strahilevitz’s 2005 article is thus somewhat of an outlier in this field of study.
80. See id. at 794 (noting that there are “relatively few published opinions
that squarely implicate an owner’s right to destroy”); supra note 47 and
accompanying text (discussing why there are a dearth of cases on the right to
destroy).
81. See id. at 796 (discussing the “bases for restricting the right to
destroy”).
82. See id. at 796 (observing that “the most prominent set of cases” limiting
the right “involve efforts by landowners to destroy their homes via will”).
83. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
84. See Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy
Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT.
L. REV. 911, 927 (2001) (acknowledging that Eyerman is the case “most often
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Appeals, made the court’s rationale quite explicit: “A well-ordered
society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources
when such acts directly affect important interests of other
members of that society.” 85 It is unclear from the opinion what
facts would have resulted in a different outcome, but this
sweeping language—though dicta—suggests that the court’s
underlying reasoning might not have necessarily been limited to
testamentary dispositions of real property. 86
Other courts have since followed Eyerman and enjoined
executors from carrying out the destructive wishes of testators on
the basis of waste. 87 Waste, however, is not the singular concern
of courts grappling with an owner’s right to destroy her property.
For example, cases concerning the destruction of “artistic works”
often implicate the right to destroy. 88 The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 (VARA) 89 permits courts to enjoin owners of works of
art from destroying their property on the basis of artists’ rights. 90
In Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 91 the destruction had already

cited as an example of a wasteful desire of a testator”).
85. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
86. Indeed, the majority opinion only goes so far to say that a person “is
generally restrained from wasteful expenditure or destructive inclinations by
the natural desire to enjoy his property or to accumulate it during his lifetime.”
Id. at 215.
87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492–93 (Sur. Ct. 1977)
(refusing to uphold a will provision directing the razing of testator’s property
and finding such a provision “immoral, a waste, [and] against public policy”); see
also Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 33, 70–71 (1999) (explaining that “bequests for purposes that a court
deems ‘capricious’” are frequently invalidated, with provisions “involving either
the disuse or destruction of property” offered as an example).
88. SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 298.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
90. See id. (granting “the author of a work of visual art . . . the right . . . to
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”); Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining
defendants from “distorting, mutilating, or modifying plaintiffs’ art work”), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
91. 192 F.3d 608 (1999).
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occurred and so the artist-plaintiff was awarded “statutory
damages.” 92
Other right to destroy cases tend to be more idiosyncratic
(perhaps due to the rarity of such cases). One court, bucking
tradition, 93 refused to enforce a provision in a will directing that
the testator be buried with some of her property. 94 Oddly enough,
the court’s justification was apparently to deter grave-robbing, 95
reasoning few other courts have found persuasive. 96 Perhaps
more understandably, courts will sometimes curtail an owner’s
right to destroy her animals by will. 97 The basis for this exception
to the right to destroy appears to rest on animal cruelty grounds,
however, as opposed to the doctrine of waste. 98
2. Scholarly Disapproval
Much of the negative treatment towards the right to destroy
comes from academia. 99 These works, of course, have no legal
92. Id. at 610.
93. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784 (“American cadavers are
frequently buried wearing wedding rings, other jewelry, and expensive
clothing.”).
94. See In re Meksras’ Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 373 (C.P. 1974)
(holding “that decedent’s direction to be buried with her jewelry is contrary to
public policy, and such provision of the will is void”). Although not strictly the
same, burying property is akin to a destructive act. See Strahilevitz, supra note
9, at 800–03 (discussing “the destruction of chattel property via burial”).
95. See Meksras’ Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d at 373 (“If a practice is developed
in our State to foster the burying of valuables with a deceased, our cemeteries
like the tombs of the Pharaohs will be ravaged and violated.”).
96. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 800–01 (observing that “Meksras is
apparently the only published American case on the question of the legality of
burying valuable chattels along with a cadaver” and that other cases “dealing
with grave robbing suggest that the Meksras rule is not adhered to
universally”).
97. See Sykas, supra note 84, at 930–34 (discussing cases in which courts
refuse to enforce will provisions providing for the destruction of the testator’s
animals).
98. See id. at 934 (noting that in a Vermont case, “public sentiment
concerning animal rights and the unique property status of pets influenced the
court’s” refusal to enforce the testamentary destruction of the animals).
99. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785 (“The right to destroy presently
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effect, but they are nevertheless influential on courts and
lawmakers. 100 Many of these arguments rest on the theories of
John Locke, who viewed property rights as stemming from
natural law and property as “gifts bestowed by God upon man” to
be “held by man in stewardship.” 101 Other scholars, however,
have argued for limiting an owner’s right to destroy her property
without invoking Locke at all. 102 This section deals primarily with
those arguments.
One of the more prominent scholarly works attacking the
right to destroy is Edward McCaffery’s Must We Have the Right to
Waste? 103 As one might infer from this title, Professor McCaffery
argues that we should abolish the right to destroy because the
right permits owners to waste valuable resources. 104 Rather than
echoing any Lockean concerns about stewardship, 105 his criticism
rests primarily on economic grounds. 106 His solution is also
lacks a constituency within the American legal academy.”). Of course, it is
important to keep in mind that, as with courts, academics have by and large
devoted little attention to the right. See id. at 794 (discussing the comparative
lack of literature on the right to destroy).
100. See id. at 784 (noting that at least some scholarly works have given
“further momentum” to the “trend of substantially curtailing property owners’
destruction rights”).
101. ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Richard H. Cox, ed., John Wiley & Sons 2014) (“Nothing
was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”). Indeed, “waste” was “a kind of
‘robbery’ for Locke.” A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 321
(1994).
102. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784–85 (discussing two critics of
the right to destroy: Joseph Sax, who argues against the right on the basis of
“cultural significance,” and Edward McCaffery, who “argue[s] that there is no
place for a right to destroy or waste one's own property in a modern economy”).
103. McCaffery, supra note 14.
104. See id. at 76–77 (contending that there are “good reasons” for the
“disdain” of waste and arguing “against the continuance of the jus abutendi [or
right to destroy]”).
105. See LOCKE, supra note 101, at 29 (espousing that one who properly used
property “wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of the
Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his
hands” (emphasis added)).
106. See McCaffery, supra note 14, at 77 (arguing that “waste . . . has
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economic in nature: a “consistent consumption tax” and shift
towards a “life estate conception of ownership.” 107 The
complexities of McCaffery’s proposal are beyond the purview of
this Note. 108 However, one central premise of his argument is
quite relevant: “The jus abutendi stands as an embarrassment in
Anglo-American law.” 109
This attitude towards the right to destroy is not unique to
Professor McCaffery. 110 Yet few attack the right directly,
preferring—whether intentionally or not—to merely ignore it. For
instance, Robert E. Goodin’s book on the philosophy of “green”
political parties is highly dismissive of the right to destroy. 111
Goodin not only denies the existence of the right, but any need for
it as well. 112 Similarly, many persuasive authorities simply fail to
mention that a property owner has the right to destroy her
property. 113 Perhaps most egregiously, the right has been absent
from the pages of Black’s Law Dictionary since the turn of this
century. 114
become the more important threat to the collective welfare of a reasonable
society”).
107. Id. at 98–103.
108. Of course, any reader would benefit from taking the time to peruse
Professor McCaffery’s arguments. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784
(referring to Professor McCaffery as one “of the nation’s most capable property
scholars”).
109. McCaffery, supra note 14, at 81. This Note takes the opposite position;
rather than an embarrassment, the jus abutendi can serve a useful purpose in a
world where the cloud storage model is the rapidly becoming the norm. See infra
Parts VI–V (developing this argument further).
110. See, e.g., PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 237–
38 (2013) (discussing instances where “law is . . . justified in intervening to
prevent destruction”).
111. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 106 (2013) (claiming
that the right to destroy “is mentioned nowhere [on standard lists of property
rights] . . . and it appears only incidentally and very much in passing on [other
lists]”).
112. See id. at 106–08 (arguing that the right to destroy cannot be justified).
113. See, e.g., 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 27 (2015) (“The primary incidents
of ownership include the right to possession, the use and enjoyment of the
property, the right to change or improve the property, and the right to alienate
the property at will.”).
114. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that “as part of an
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D. The Right Today

The sum of this history is that the right to destroy is
recognized, but limited; tolerated, but disfavored. 115 Professor
Sprankling’s text on international property law keenly observes
the difficulty in discussing it: “Despite its fundamental nature,
the right to destroy is rarely made explicit in municipal law. Yet
the right is implicitly recognized in virtually all legal systems.” 116
American law today reflects this global attitude towards the right
to destroy, neither expressly authorizing nor prohibiting property
owners (such as Blendtec) 117 from destroying their property in
most circumstances. 118
Whether the limitations discussed in the preceding subpart
are sound is not the inquiry at the heart of this Note. More
troubling is the fact that some courts fail to include the right to
destroy (limited or otherwise) among other property rights,
thereby threatening to erode even its implicit recognition. 119 It is
worth remembering that the right to destroy was once considered
a fundamental property right, for reasons that have not since lost
their relevance. 120 Although, as this Note will argue, the growing
extensive revision, the seventh edition’s editors decided to exclude . . . the right
to destroy”).
115. Professor Sprankling’s 2012 property casebook is illustrative here,
listing the right to destroy alongside the more familiar rights to use, exclude,
and transfer, but with the caveat that its “scope . . . remains unclear.”
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note 10, at § 1.03(B)(5).
116. SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293.
117. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (discussing the blender
company’s exercise of the right to destroy via promotional videos distributed on
YouTube).
118. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 296 (“The
logical implication is that a person holding absolute ownership . . . would have
the right to destroy.”); see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing cases recognizing,
and limiting, the right to destroy).
119. Compare Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377, 385
(Tex. 2012) (“Some of the key rights that make up the bundle of property rights
include the rights to possess, use, transfer, and exclude others.”), with Council
on American-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d
311, 339 (D.D.C. 2011) (“One of the many sticks in the owner’s bundle of
property rights is the right to destroy the property.”).
120. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing justifications for the right to destroy
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trend of maintaining digital property on the cloud provides a new
justification for reaffirming the right to destroy, 121 the underlying
spirit of that justification is rooted in, and informed by, this
history.
III. Understanding the Cloud
“Nobody understands the Cloud!” bawls a beleaguered Jay
Hargrove (portrayed by Jason Segal) in the 2014 movie Sex
Tape. 122 Although a comedic exaggeration, the words probably
capture the sentiment of many when it comes to cloud
computing. 123 Therefore, before going further, it would be prudent
to explain what, exactly, the cloud is. That explanation proceeds
in two steps. The first subpart will examine the nature of digital
property itself. 124 The second subpart will define the cloud and
chronicle the almost meteoric rise of cloud computing. 125 Finally,
with this foundation in mind, the last subpart will provide a brief
overview of the cloud computing service pertinent to this Note,
cloud storage. 126
A. The Digital Property Question
The central subject of this Note is digital property stored in
the cloud—but what is digital property? Before that question can
in Roman law and English common law).
121. See infra Part V (arguing the need for the right to destroy in the
present era of cloud computing).
122. Sex Tape (Columbia Pictures 2014). Sex Tape follows the arduous
journey of a married couple attempting to delete a private video inadvertently
uploaded to the cloud. Id. Though by no means a masterpiece, the film usefully
illustrates the need for a right to destroy in the cloud computing context.
123. See WAKEFIELD, CITRIX CLOUD SURVEY GUIDE 1 (Aug. 2012) (reporting
the public’s misconceptions regarding the cloud); see also HOOFNAGLE, supra
note 25, at 9 (discussing the public’s wariness of cloud computing).
124. See infra Part III.A (addressing whether the law recognizes digital
property and how “digital property” ought to be defined).
125. See infra Part III.B (discussing cloud computing generally).
126. See infra Part III.C (defining cloud storage and providing examples of
cloud storage services).
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be resolved, a threshold issue demands exploration: does digital
property, in the legal sense, even exist? The answer,
frustratingly, is both yes and no. 127
In Kremen v. Cohen, 128 Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that “[p]roperty is a
broad concept that includes ‘every intangible benefit and
prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.’” 129 Electronic
files—think images, documents, songs, and other data—would
appear to meet this definition; although often subject to license
agreements, 130 we buy, sell, trade, and use electronic files with
ever increasing frequency. 131 Indeed, digital estate planners have
recently begun to crop up nationwide. 132 Yet the law often ignores
127. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 810
(2015) [hereinafter Fairfield, Bitproperty] (“[O]nline property interests are
either intellectual property interests or strange amalgams of contract, licensing,
and pseudoproperty law, such as those that govern users’ interests in e-books,
MP3s, software, or downloaded movies.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, False
Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 119, 142–43 (2007) (discussing views “express[ing] skepticism that
digital code within a computer can or should be analogized to a form of
property”).
128. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
129. Id. at 1030 (quoting Downing v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 198 P.2d 923, 926
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)).
130. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839 (“Property rights in
digital copies of copyrighted material drift in a limbo of [Digital Rights
Management] and end user license agreements.”); infra Part V.C (discussing the
use of license agreements in the digital property marketplace).
131. See, e.g., Tim Hurd, Law Journals and Emerging Publishing
Technology, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 231, 232 (2013) (observing that some
journals make their issues available for purchase “in an eBook format”); Ashley
F. Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death: What Will Your Heirs Have
Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFFALO L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2014) (recognizing the
“wide array of digital assets” owned by individuals today and noting that “the
average American believed his or her digital assets to be worth about $55,000”);
Duncan Clark, Playing by the Rules, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2005, 7:07 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2005/sep/09/netmusic.internet (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting that “a small but growing number of labels and artists
have started selling MP3s directly from their own websites”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See, e.g., Digital Assets, EVERPLANS, https://www.everplans.com/digitalassets (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (providing instructions on how to plan one’s
“digital” estate, which includes “social media profiles, downloaded music, photos,
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key differences in the types of computer programming code that
make up all things digital, regarding the entire category as a
subset of intellectual property. 133 Thus one could persuasively
argue that the common name for goods made up of “electronic
symbols created via a computer,” 134 digital property, is something
of a misnomer.
Property law’s reluctance to recognize digital property is not
necessarily without justification. Some kinds of digital property
are not analogous to tangible goods; a block of code that gives a
website a particular function, for instance, instinctively seems
like something that intellectual property law should properly
govern. 135 On the other hand, a PDF version of a novel serves the
same function as a paper copy of the novel bound and printed by
a publisher. 136 True, there are some differences: a person can
make copies of a PDF far more easily than she can make copies of
a printed book. 137 But these differences arguably lie in degree, not
[and] videos”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1049–
50 (2005) [hereinafter Fairfield, Virtual Property] (noting that some “code” is
“protected by the law of intellectual property” and that “we continue to govern
virtual property through the law of intellectual property”); Moringiello, supra
note 127, at 147 (observing the “tendency to place new intangible rights into the
category of intellectual property in case law and scholarship”). But see Kremen
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the lower court’s
holding “that domain names, although a form of property, are intangibles not
subject to conversion”).
134. Michael S. Richardson, Comment, The Monopoly on Digital
Distribution, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 158 (2014).
Richardson observes with disapproval that digital property is “not considered
property” because “property is limited to a “material object or movement of
power.” Id.
135. See Telebright Corp., Inc. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super.
384, 388–89 (2012) (characterizing an employee’s “computer code” that is
“added” to her employer’s “software” as intellectual property).
136. See Caitlin J. Akins, Student Article, Conversion of Digital Property:
Protecting Consumers in the Age of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215,
244–47 (2010) (discussing the similarities between e-books and physical books
and arguing that “intangible digital property, like e-books,” should be treated
“as chattels”).
137. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the
movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly

488

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2017)

substance. 138 As scholars have noted, the tangibility–intangibility
distinction makes little sense in the modern, digitized world. 139
Indeed, many have argued that the technology is now in
place to treat intangible digital property exactly as tangible
property. 140 Some American courts have adopted this view in
part, applying ordinary property law to certain digital assets. 141
Legislatures, too, are beginning to realize the need for broader
digital property rights; several states have enacted “laws
regarding digital assets” in recent years. 142 Courts of other
nations have gone even further; according to the European Court
of Justice, there is “no difference whether the copy of the
computer program was made available by means of a download or

instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and negligible
cost.”).
138. Furthermore, technologies exist that “limit unauthorized uses of
copyrighted materials by adding sophisticated security programs to digital
products, making it difficult for users to create copies.” Akins, supra note 136, at
221; see also Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 867 (discussing “emerging
technology that attempted to create discrete, rival rights in intangible assets”).
139. See Moringiello, supra note 127, at 120 (arguing that “[c]lassifying
property according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories
unrelated to significant legal distinction”).
140. See, e.g., Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 874 (advocating the
use of “block chain technology” to “create an operational system of digital
property”); Akins, supra note 136, at 250–51 (arguing that the tort of conversion
should to apply to digital property); Richardson, supra note 134, at 171 (arguing
that “the first sale doctrine” should be applied to “digital property transactions
that resemble real world sales”).
141. See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278
(N.Y. 2007) (“We cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why [drafting a
document in electronic form] should be treated any differently from production
by pen on paper . . . . A document stored on a computer hard drive has the same
value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet.”); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d
1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the tort of conversion applicable to domain
names).
142. Watkins, supra note 131, at 220. For instance, Delaware law provides
that a “fiduciary may exercise control over any and all rights in digital assets
and digital accounts of an account holder.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2015).
How courts will interpret these statutes, however, remains to be seen. See
Watkins, supra note 131, at 221 n.179 (“No one has attempted to use these
statutes in court yet, so it is hard to say for sure the statutes’ value.”).
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on a DVD/CD-ROM.” 143 A Dutch court later followed this same
reasoning to permit the sale of “secondhand” e-books. 144
Now, to return to the question that began this subpart: what
is digital property? For the purposes of this Note, it is digital
assets. 145 These assets include “images, photos, videos, and text
files.” 146 Although such assets were once predominantly stored
locally, on hard drives and USB sticks, for instance, today they
are often stored elsewhere, in a frequently misunderstood place
known as the cloud. 147

143. Richardson, supra note 134, at 168.
144. See David Meyer, Secondhand E-bookstore Tom Kabinet Can Stay
Online, Dutch Court Rules, GIGAOM (July 22, 2014, 1:19 AM),
http://gigaom.com/2014/07/22/secondhand-ebook-store-tom-kabinet-can-stayonline-dutch-court-rules (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“A Dutch secondhand ebookstore has successfully defended a court case brought about by the country’s
publishers’ association, which argues that e-books cannot be legally resold.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. Although the legal status of digital property can only be called
unresolved, digital assets have become ubiquitous in our society. See JOHN
PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION
OF DIGITAL NATIVES 2 (2009) (noting that many “aspects” of young peoples’
“lives . . . are mediated by digital technologies”).
146. John Romano, A Working Definition of Digital Assets, THE DIGITAL
BEYOND (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2011/09/a-workingdefinition-of-digital-assets/comment-page-1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a more encompassing definition
that would necessarily include the kinds of digital assets pertinent to this Note,
see FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript at 14
Digital property refers to your ownership rights . . . in digital objects,
like the game, movie, book, or music that you have purchased and
downloaded. Digital property can be as new and strange as a Bitcoin
or a magical sword in a massively multiplayer online video game, or
as old as the bits and bytes of data that represent the numbers in
your bank account or stock portfolio.
147. See Lixian Loong Hantover, The Cloud and the Deep Sea: How Cloud
Storage Raises the Stakes for Undersea Cable Security and Liability, 19 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 1, 1 (2013) (noting that we have “give[n] up our hard drives for
storage online in the cloud”).
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B. The Rise of Cloud Computing

What is the cloud? Even among industry experts, the answer
to that question is up in the air. 148 The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) provides a very specific
definition, replete with industry jargon:
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of
five essential characteristics [on-demand self-service, broad
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and
measured service], three service models [software-as-a-service,
platform-as-a-service, and infrastructure-as-a-service], and
four deployment models [private cloud, community cloud,
public cloud, and hybrid cloud]. 149

Others, by contrast, view the cloud very generally as “a
metaphor for the Internet.” 150 There are myriad definitions
between these two extremes, 151 but one strikes a good balance:
cloud computing is the “on-demand delivery” of “resources and
applications over the Internet.” 152 This definition, though less
technical than the NIST’s, is perhaps more palatable to the IT
novice and will suffice for the purposes of this Note.
These competing definitions are relevant because how we
conceptualize the cloud determines, among other things, when
exactly cloud computing got its start. 153 It would be easy to
assume that the cloud is new technology, given that the term was
148. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the
Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 5–6 (2014) (discussing various proposed definitions of cloud computing).
149. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 19, at 2.
150. Sandeen, supra note 148, at 6.
151. See id. (“Many people and organizations have defined cloud computing
slightly differently.”).
152. RAY RAFAELS, CLOUD COMPUTING: FROM BEGINNING TO END 12 (2015).
153. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 18 (observing that “cloud computing is
either a revolutionary development or the hyped-up, repackaging of pre-existing
business models”).
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first coined in the late 1990s 154 and entered the common parlance
only recently. 155 The foundations of cloud computing, however,
were laid out long ago. 156 These early, mostly theoretical notions
of the cloud resemble what some today have equated cloud
computing with: the internet. 157 On the other hand, the meaning
of cloud computing “has evolved over time, and it is still
evolving.” 158
It is thus unclear when, precisely, cloud computing began to
really take hold; such dating might not even be possible. 159 What
is clear, however, is that the cloud has taken hold, with no less
firm a grasp than other ubiquitous technologies, such as personal
computers themselves. 160 The vast majority of businesses use
cloud computing in one way or another, 161 and the same is true
154. See Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The Ethical Implications of
Cloud Computing for Lawyers, 31 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 69, 72
(2014) (noting that “Ramnath K. Chellappa of Emory University” coined “the
term ‘cloud computing’ in 1997”).
155. See Google Trends, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=%
22cloud%20computing%22 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting no Google
searches for the term “cloud computing” until 2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
156. Pardau & Edwards, supra note 154, at 72 (observing that “the
underlying concept” of cloud computing “dates back to the Fifties”).
157. See id. (noting that in 1969 a computer scientist “introduced an idea for
‘an intergalactic computer network’ in which programs and data could be
accessed from anywhere”). This makes sense, as cloud computing was perhaps a
“natural progression for the computer, Internet, and telecommunications
industries.” Sandeen, supra note 148, at 24–25.
158. David Linthicum, Pop Quiz: Who Invented Cloud Computing?,
INFOWORLD (May 30, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2608420/cloudcomputing/pop-quiz--who-invented-cloud-computing-.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See id. (“The concept of ‘the cloud’ is and was far different from its
meaning in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s . . . .”).
160. See, e.g., F5, THE NEW LANGUAGE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1 (2015),
https://f5.com/Portals/1/Images/infographics/Inforgraphic-The-New-LanguageOf-Cloud-Computing/Info%20Paper_New%20Language%20of%20Cloud%20APA
C%20(12July2015)%20FINAL.pdf (“Today cloud is no longer the buzzword of
five years ago, and is now part of the fabric of the modern enterprise.”).
161. See RIGHTSCALE, 2015 STATE OF THE CLOUD REPORT 5–6 (2015),
http://assets.rightscale.com/uploads/pdfs/RightScale-2015-State-of-the-CloudReport.pdf (finding that, of 930 professionals surveyed, only ten percent do not
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for individuals, even if they are unaware of the precise meaning
of the cloud. 162 Moreover, consumer usage of the cloud is
predicted to grow even higher in the years to come. 163 Although
cloud computing takes many forms, 164 one cloud-based service in
particular might account for this surge in popularity: the subject
of this Note and the following subpart, cloud storage. 165
C. An Overview of Cloud Storage
Cloud storage, also known as “storage-as-a-service,” 166 is
most likely what comes to mind when consumers think of the
cloud. 167 It is, in short, a “model of data storage where digital
and do not plan to use cloud computing services).
162. See Tony Danova, Most People Are Still Confused About Cloud Storage,
and No One Service Is Winning the Race to Educate and Acquire Users, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/people-usethe-cloud-and-dont-even-realize-it-2014-7 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting
that “90% of global internet users are already on the cloud, and that number
will remain steady as internet usage spreads globally,” but acknowledging that,
“despite so much usage, consumer awareness of cloud services remains low”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. See Jagdish Rebello, Consumers Aggressively Migrate Data to Cloud
Storage in First Half of 2012, IHS TECH. (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://technology.ihs.com/413377/consumers-aggressively-migrate-data-to-cloud
storage-in-first-half-of-2012 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (predicting “1.3 billion”
subscriptions to cloud services by 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
164. See Christina Chow, Note, Capitol Records, Inc.: Holding No Public
Performance Violations for Deleting Duplicative Files Off Cloud Servers and the
Positive Future Implications Regarding Consumer Efficiency, 20 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 121, 124 (2012) (“Currently, there are a number of different types of cloud
computing.”).
165. See id.
One of the more recently developed cloud servers is one that acts in
the same manner as a personal computer's internal memory. Cloud
servers of this type, such as Dropbox, allow users to sign up for an
account and receive a certain amount of storage space where they can
save, store, and access files as they would on their computer's hard
drive or on an external memory stick.
166. RALPH STAIR & GEORGE REYNOLDS, PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
121 (2015).
167. See David Colarusso, Note, Heads in the Cloud, a Coming Storm: The
Interplay of Cloud Computing, Encryption, and the Fifth Amendment’s
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data are remotely accessed, stored, maintained, and backed
up.” 168 Cloud storage can itself be divided into several
subcategories, but predominantly refers to the “public cloud.” 169
Other forms include private or personal cloud storage, where
users essentially maintain their own cloud (or pay a third party
to maintain a cloud exclusively for their use), 170 and hybrid cloud
storage, a “composition” of both public and private cloud
storage. 171 The security of a private cloud alleviates some of this
Note’s concerns, 172 but requires a heavier investment of resources
and more “hands on management” compared to public cloud
services. 173 As such, private cloud storage is not a practical option
for individuals and out of reach for many businesses. 174
The public cloud storage model essentially consists of users
(not necessarily paying subscribers) storing their digital files on
servers owned and operated by a third party. 175 Access is

Protection Against Self-Incrimination, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 81 (2011)
(observing the “general recognition that cloud computing is the practice of
storing and processing data”).
168. RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 32.
169. See LUCIO GRANDINETTI ET AL., PERVASIVE CLOUD COMPUTING
TECHNOLOGIES: FUTURE OUTLOOKS AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 62
(2013) (describing the public cloud as “the main cloud computing model”).
170. See id. at 61 (noting that a “private cloud . . . is operated solely for an
organization,” but that it “may exist on premise or off premise”).
171. Id. at 62.
172. See id. at 61–62 (2013) (explaining that the “private cloud” lacks some
“risks and threats such as security, governance, and reliability concerns,” and
observing that “a customer of a private cloud has a high degree of control and
oversight of the physical and logical security aspects of private cloud
infrastructure”).
173. Id. at 61.
174. See S. SRINIVASAN, CLOUD COMPUTING BASICS 17 (“Private clouds are
predominantly used by large businesses that need to supplement their data
centers in a reliable way.”). Therefore, this Note focuses exclusively on the
“public cloud” and use that term interchangeably with cloud storage in general.
175. See Aaron J. Gold, Note, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment
and Searching Cloud Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2321, 2323 (2015) (“Companies providing public cloud
storage maintain user data on clusters of networked servers at off-site
locations.”).
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typically granted through a website or mobile application. 176 This
data, now on the cloud, can then be accessed by anyone with the
user’s credentials. 177 Moreover, the files are typically “synced,”
which means they exist simultaneously on the cloud and the
user’s local device, such as a computer’s hard drive or the internal
memory of a smartphone, via frequent updating. 178
Although the cloud is spoken of in the singular, there is a
veritable multitude of public cloud storage services. 179 Many are
geared towards individuals and small businesses, offering free
storage up to a certain allotment, then charging a fee on a sliding
scale. 180 Some of these services may even be automatic; that is,
the user herself may not necessarily be aware that her files are
being stored on the cloud. 181 Other cloud storage providers more
176. See id. at 2323–24 (observing that cloud storage users can “access their
data from any Internet-capable device”).
177. See id. at 2334 n.73 (“For example, members of the William & Mary
Law Review share a cloud storage account provided by Dropbox.”).
178. See Jeffrey Allen, ROAD WARRIOR: Data Migration and
Synchronization, 30 GPSOLO 4, 4 (2013) (noting that “[cloud] data can be
synchronized easily across devices”).
179. See Stacy Fisher, Best Cloud Storage Services for Backup, BALANCE,
http://freebies.about.com/od/computerfreebies/tp/free-cloud-storage.htm
(last
updated Jan. 3, 2017) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (weighing the pros and cons of
several cloud storage options) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
180. See, e.g., Buy, Change, or Cancel Storage Plans, GOOGLE,
http://support.google.com/drive/answer/2375123?hl=en (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (offering plans of fifteen gigabytes of cloud storage for free, 100 gigabytes
for $1.99 a month, and thirty terabytes—or 30,000 gigabytes—for $299.99 a
month, among others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (observing that
“[c]ell phone users often may not know whether particular information is stored
on the device or in the cloud”); FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript
at 173 (noting that certain devices “enable cloud storage not only for data that
the user wishes to store elsewhere, but also for every temporary or unsaved file
on several widely used applications and even for local files residing on a user’s
encrypted hard drive”); David Gilbert, Apple ‘Actively Investigating’ if iCloud Is
to Blame for Jennifer Lawrence Nude Photo Leak, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2014),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/apple-actively-investigating-if-icloud-blamejennifer-lawrence-nude-photo-leak-1463551 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Apple’s
iCloud automatically stores iPhone users photos and video in the cloud as a
back-up measure, with many people unaware that this is happening.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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directly target commercial enterprises. 182 These services tend to
be costlier, but emphasize features such as privacy and
security. 183
It is easy to appreciate why consumers have so rapidly
adopted the cloud for their digital storage needs. 184 For
businesses, the benefits of cloud storage are both practical and
economical. 185 For individuals, cloud storage offers unprecedented
convenience. 186 This latter point is especially important given
that modern personal technology tends to be spread around
multiple devices (the combination of a laptop, work computer,
tablet, and smartphone, for instance) rather than a single
machine tethered to one particular location. 187 It is thus no
182. See Shobhit Seth, 8 Best Cloud Storage Solutions for Small Business,
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personalfinance/090715/8-best-cloud-storage-solutions-small-business.asp (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing several business-oriented cloud storage providers) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. See, e.g., id. (discussing the cloud storage service “SpiderOak,” which
touts among its features “privacy” and “full control to the clients”).
184. See Erin Griffith, Who’s Winning the Consumer Cloud Storage Wars?,
FORTUNE (Nov. 6, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/06/dropboxgoogle-drive-microsoft-onedrive (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Dropbox claims 300
million users as of May. Google Drive has 240 million users as of September.
Microsoft says OneDrive has ‘more than’ 250 million users.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. See IS TECHNOLOGY, CLOUD STORAGE TRENDS FOR 2015 2 (2015),
http://www.iisl.com/userfiles/files/10294_cloud_trends_2015_WP.pdf (reporting
that “80% of companies that adopt cloud technologies see improvements within
six months of adoption”).
186. See Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing
Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 261, 268 (2013) (“Users choose to store their information in the
Cloud, and not on their computers, for a variety of reasons. Information may be
stored in the Cloud as a backup . . . [and] users of all types find it convenient to
access cloud-stored information wherever they have an Internet connection.”).
187. See STUART TAYLOR ET AL., A “MARRIAGE MADE IN HEAVEN”: MOBILE
DEVICES MEET THE MOBILE CLOUD 2 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/abo
ut/ac79/docs/sp/Mobile_Cloud_Device.pdf (“The collision of [the trends of mobile
devices and cloud computing]—the mobile cloud—stands to . . . radically alter
the way people live, learn, work, and play.”); Wilson, supra note 186, at 268
(observing the correlation between the use of smartphones and cloud storage
services).
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exaggeration to say that cloud storage, for most, is less a matter
of utility than necessity. 188
IV. Property Rights Lost in the Cloud
We now (hopefully) understand what the cloud is and why it
has become so prevalent. 189 But cloud computing is not without
its drawbacks. As alluded to in this Note’s introduction, the rapid
adoption of cloud storage services threatens the property rights of
the owners of cloud-maintained data in two closely related
senses. 190 First, it prevents such owners from fully controlling
their property. 191 Second, it robs such owners of the certainty that
their property rights—whether the right to use, transfer, exclude,
destroy, or some other—are being effectively exercised. 192 We
might alternatively label this as a “peace of mind” problem. The
following subparts will discuss these problems more
comprehensively in turn.
A. The Control Problem
Anglo-American law conceptualizes property as a “bundle of
rights,” 193 but what are these rights meant to actually confer
upon their holders? The answer, essentially, is control. 194 This
188. See STUART TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 187, at 6, 11 (noting that
“smartphone usage and the adoption of mobile cloud services are intimately
linked, forming a virtuous circle”).
189. See supra Part III.B–C (discussing the cloud and cloud storage).
190. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text (arguing that the
convenience of the cloud comes at the cost of property owners’ control and peace
of mind).
191. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the “control problem” of cloud storage).
192. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the “certainty problem” of cloud
storage).
193. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2008); SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING
PROPERTY, supra note 10, at § 1.03(B).
194. See, e.g., Laura B. Bartell, The Lease of Money in Bankruptcy: Time for
Consistency?, 16 BANK. DEV. J. 267, 318 (2000) (“Although one can have control
over property without ownership . . . ownership of property generally carries
with it the unrestricted right to control.”); FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22,
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becomes clear when we consider the rights—the “sticks” in the
“bundle”—themselves. 195 The right to possess and use is most
obvious; to “use” a thing, in the most basic sense, is to “control”
it. 196 Moreover, when dealing with intangible property such as
data (whether stored on the cloud or not), control is the only
means of possession. 197
Other property rights also endow their holders with control.
The right to exclude, and the corollary right to include, 198 allow
the right-holder to control who can make use of the property and
to what extent. 199 The right to destroy confers the owner with the
manuscript at 13 (“We buy [property] so we can control it—protect it from
others, use it ourselves, and, if we permit them to, determine how others use
it.”); Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: A Solution for
Common Law Property Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 455, 465 (2003) (observing that
“management and control over property includes many if not most of the
benefits of ownership”).
195. Recall the most prominent rights in the bundle: “(1) the right to
exclude; (2) the right to transfer; (3) the right to possess and use; and (4) the
right to destroy.” SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note 10, at
§ 1.03(B). Depending on who you ask, however, the right to destroy may or may
not be included in this list. See supra Part II.D (observing that the right to
destroy is not consistently recognized).
http://www.merriam196. Compare
Control,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
webster.com/dictionary/control (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining “control” as
“to direct the actions or function of (something)”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), with Use, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/use (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining “use” as “the act
or practice of employing something”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
197. See LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 258 (3d ed. 2014) (“Control is a conceptual analog to
possession for certain types of intangible collateral, property for which physical
possession is impossible.”).
198. See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 861
(2014) (arguing that the right to exclude implies the right to include and
discussing “a number of institutional arrangements by which owners may
include others”).
199. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript at 13 (“The ability
to control what goes on in and on and through our property is a function of our
ability to exclude others.”); see also Kelly, supra note 198, at 869 (utilizing “the
analogy of the gatekeeper to suggest that owners can include as well as
exclude”). A gatekeeper, of course, is “a person who controls access.” Gatekeeper,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gatekeeper
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and
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ultimate control over the property: the property’s very existence.
This is perhaps why the right is regarded as the most “extreme”
stick in the bundle. 200 Finally, the right to transfer grants the
right-holder the power to control who shall possess any one or all
of the other rights. 201
Conversely, a significant consequence of storing digital
property on the cloud is a lack of control, which manifests most
clearly when the user attempts to delete such property. 202 To be
sure, cloud storage is a predominantly user-managed system. 203
The subscriber to the cloud storage service decides which of her
digital assets are to be stored on the cloud and who can access
those assets—ostensibly, at least. 204 In reality, the user is merely
sending commands to the cloud storage provider via an
application. 205 The effects of those commands occur “under the
hood,” through code designed and managed by the cloud storage
service. 206
Lee Law Review).
200. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788, 794–95 (discussing the view that
“the owner’s right to destroy his property [is] the most extreme use of property
imaginable”).
201. See Kelly, supra note 198, at 869 (noting that the right to transfer is
“an owner’s powers to transfer particular sticks in [the] bundle” of rights
(citations omitted)). We might thus consider the right to transfer a kind of metaright within this framework.
202. See, e.g., Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: Defining
and Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud
Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 289 (2010) (observing that
cloud users “give up control over [their] data because much of it is stored in
some unknown location in the cloud”); Robert Sheldon, Deleting Files in the
Cloud, SIMPLE TALK (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.simple-talk.com/cloud/clouddata/deleting-files-in-the-cloud (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (explaining that cloud
storage users “can’t control what service providers do with their data, especially
the deleted stuff”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2324–29 (discussing the user’s role in
storing digital files through cloud storage).
204. See id. at 2323, 2334 (noting that cloud storage users “can upload data
to cloud servers in various ways” and that anyone with the user’s credentials
can access cloud-maintained data).
205. See id. at 2347 (observing that a cloud provider may not necessarily
adhere to a cloud user’s request).
206. See RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 32–38 (discussing the mechanics of
cloud storage). In other words, “just because [files stored on the cloud] disappear
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Furthermore, the owner of the cloud-maintained data lacks
the power to prevent the cloud storage provider from deleting
that data. 207 Of course, the cloud storage provider is not likely to
do this willfully. 208 But the cloud is maintained by humans, and
humans are prone to error. 209 This, combined with the cloud
storage providers’ lack of accountability, 210 reinforces the central
proposition of this Note: it is the owner of the cloud, and not the
owner of the cloud-maintained digital property, who has all the
control, power, and, indeed, the very incidents of ownership that
property law is meant to secure. 211
These are not mere hypothetical concerns. Some time ago,
the cloud storage provider Dropbox mishandled access
permissions to files stored on its servers, allowing anyone,
theoretically, to download the private files of another. 212 In
from view doesn’t mean they’re gone forever.” Sheldon, supra note 202.
207. See, e.g., Ovi Demetrian Jr., Google Drive Storage Loses Google Docs
Data, GOOGLE DRIVE SUCKS, http://googledrivesucks.com (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (discussing one user’s experience of losing “years of work and personal
memories that [he] saved as Google Docs files because of a poor user interface”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
208. Still, it is fairly easy to imagine some scenarios in which a cloud storage
provider may purposefully delete its users’ data. For instance, suppose a user
stores a pirated music or movie file on her Dropbox account. Dropbox then may
not only desire to delete the user’s data, but may be required to do so by a court
of law. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (discussing a court order permitting the plaintiff to enter defendant’s
premises and delete pirated software). Our sympathies may not lie with the
digital pirate in that particular case, but the fact that a third party has that
kind of power over a person’s property (albeit stolen property) is troubling at the
very least.
209. See Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements,
and Limitation on Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
163, 170 (2012) (“Cloud providers go to great lengths to provide reliable services
to their customers. . . . Yet despite these precautions, server crashes, hard drive
failures, and other disasters do occur, and customers suffer the consequences.”).
210. See id. at 168–69 (noting that many cloud storage agreements contain
clauses limiting liability).
211. See Pound, supra note 73, at 997 (observing that “property involves six
rights,” including “possessing” and “using”); supra notes 24–33 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between owning digital property
maintained on the cloud, digital property generally, and tangible property).
212. See Nate Lord, Communicating the Data Security Risks of File Sharing

500

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2017)

another instance, a “security flaw” resulted in numerous files
stored on Dropbox being exposed to the internet at large. 213 These
may have only been “temporary situation[s],” but, as one industry
expert put it, they “demonstrate[] the loss of user control when
using [cloud storage] services.” 214
Perhaps more famously, in 2014 a computer hacker stole a
number of celebrities’ digital photos stored on iCloud, 215 one of
the more popular cloud storage services. 216 What surprised one of
these victims, however, was that the stolen photos were supposed
to have been deleted. 217 Perhaps someone should have warned
her: when it comes to cloud storage, there is no guarantee that
the user’s commands will be heeded. 218 Some cloud storage
providers, in fact, are entirely upfront about this (to the extent a

& Cloud Storage, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2015), http://digital
guardian.com/blog/communicating-data-security-risks-file-sharing-cloud-storage
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing “a brief period of time during which
anyone could access any file stored by Dropbox just by knowing the correct
URL”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
213. Sharif Sakr, Dropbox Cuts Access to Shared Documents that Were
(May
6,
2014),
Accidentally
Exposed
to
the
Web,
ENGADGET
http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/06/dropbox-forced-to-cut-links-to-shareddocuments (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
214. Id.
215. See Alan Duke, 5 Things to Know About the Celebrity Nude Photo
Hacking Scandal, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/showbiz/hacked-nudephotos-five-things (last updated Oct. 12, 2014) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017)
(“There’s a list of 100 celebrity women—and one man—whose photos were
supposedly downloaded and stolen by a hacker.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
216. See Jon Fingas, Strategy Analytics: iCloud, Dropbox and Amazon Top
(Mar.
21,
2013),
Cloud
Media
in
the
US,
ENGADGET
http://www.engadget.com/2013/03/21/strategy-analytics-cloud-media-marketshare (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting that iCloud is the most widely used
cloud storage service among consumers) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
217. See Duke, supra note 215 (noting that one actress tweeted that her
hacked photos “were deleted long ago”).
218. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2347 (“Even after a user deletes his data or
closes his account, many cloud storage providers will preserve data on their
servers for a period of time.”).
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terms of service clause can be considered upfront). 219 That, of
course, does not eliminate the problem. 220
B. The Peace of Mind Problem
When the cloud storage user comes to learn that she lacks of
control over her cloud-maintained digital property, 221 what
naturally follows is a loss of peace of mind. 222 This is a problem
because peace of mind, certainty, security—however one wishes
to phrase it—is a fundamental aspect of property law. 223 The
right to destroy arguably exemplifies this background principle of
property rights, as it is the only right that, if effectively exercised,
is necessarily permanent. 224 The process of deleting data from the
cloud, however, is anything but certain. 225
Put another way, this is an issue of trust. 226 As computer
expert Ray Rafaels observes, the cloud user “relinquishes direct
219. See id. at 2339 (discussing cloud storage “agreements in which the
provider retains the expressed right to access and, in some cases, use the
information provided”).
220. See infra Part IV.D (discussing why a solution is needed even if cloud
storage is utilized on a voluntary basis).
221. See supra Part IV.A (noting the extent to which a cloud storage
provider maintains control over the digital property its users store in the cloud).
222. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 25, at 9 (reporting that many consumers
are “very concerned” about cloud storage providers selling or using their data
and keeping their data after they attempt to delete it).
223. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 189–90 (Stephen R. Munzer ed.,
2001) (discussing the interests “advanced by a system of property rights,”
including peace of mind and security); Joseph William Singer, Property as the
Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1316 (2014) (describing “property” as a
“stable basis of expectation” and arguing “that a property law system should
give us . . . peace of mind”).
224. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (“[B]y destroying a vase, [one]
permanently exclude[s] third parties from using it. . . . [One] do[es] not merely
use it—[one] use[s] it up.”).
225. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2347 (noting that cloud storage providers
may retain users’ data even after the user apparently deletes them).
226. See RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 58 (discussing issues of trust in “the
cloud computing paradigm”); Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 79
(observing that “it is up to the user . . . to trust that the [cloud storage] provider
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control over many aspects of security and, in doing so, confers a
level of trust onto the cloud provider.” 227 One way to remedy the
problem may be by contract, 228 but that is no effective cure
because cloud storage contracts are predominantly nonnegotiable. 229 Moreover, such contracts tend to be ambiguous as
to what rights the cloud storage provider may actually exercise
with regard to its users’ data. 230
A brief glance at a few cloud storage services will prove the
point. We have already discussed Dropbox, 231 but it bears
repeating in the context of this problem that the language used
by its privacy policy is elusive at best. 232 JustCloud, another cloud
storage vender, provides in its terms and conditions that it “may
retain” data users store on its servers “for a period after [the]
trial or license has been terminated, expired, or otherwise
lapsed.” 233 Google, a giant in this arena, assures users of Google
Drive (a cloud storage service) that they retain all rights to their
digital property, 234 but the company’s support pages state the
will delete her information”).
227. RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 58.
228. See id. at 58–59 (suggesting that cloud computing contracts “state
clearly that the [user] retains ownership over all its data” and that “the cloud
provider” may not “use the data for its own purposes”).
229. See Calloway, supra note 209, at 172 (noting that cloud users lack
“sufficient bargaining power” and “are often left with a boilerplate clickwrap
agreement”). Calloway observes that although in the past “judges either held
[such agreements] to be unenforceable contracts of adhesion or found particular
terms to be unconscionable,” there has been “a jurisprudential shift towards a
willingness to enforce these contracts.” Id. at 168–69.
230. See infra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (discussing the vague
language of several cloud storage providers’ respective terms of service).
231. Supra notes 29, 31, 219 and accompanying text.
232. Compare Delete Files in Dropbox, supra note 29 (instructing users on
how to “permanently” delete their files), with Dropbox Privacy Policy, supra note
31 (providing that there “might be some latency” before Dropbox deletes the files
and that Dropbox “may retain” the files under certain circumstances).
233. JustCloud Terms and Conditions, JUSTCLOUD, http://www.justcloud.
com/terms (emphasis added) (last updated Sept. 19, 2016) (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
policies/terms/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2014) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (informing
users of Google Drive that “what belongs to you stays yours”) (on file with the
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“owner of the file” may contact Google “to help recover a deleted
file or folder for a limited time.” 235 Google’s policy may be born of
good intentions, but it nevertheless begs several questions: How
long is a limited time? Where is the data stored between deletion
and recovery? Who can access the supposedly deleted file? More
important, given the vague language used by Google and other
cloud storage providers, can the cloud user be said to have any
certainty with regard to the usage of her cloud-maintained digital
property?
Even if the cloud provider states unambiguously that files
will be deleted upon command, the issue of trust is not cured
because it is the cloud provider, not the cloud user, who is in
control of the digital property. 236 A recent case involving the video
messaging application Snapchat exemplifies this particular
problem. 237 Briefly, Snapchat claimed that any messages sent
using its application would be deleted within a period of time
designated by the sender. 238 Indeed, Snapchat’s own FAQ stated
unequivocally: “[Messages] disappear after the timer runs out.” 239
Yet, according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), this claim

Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. Find or Recover a File, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/drive/
answer/2405957?hl=en (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
236. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (“Users are embracing the cloud in droves
for good reason . . . . The flip side to this is that the cloud also translates to a
loss of control.”).
237. See Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 (May 8,
2014) 2014 WL 1993567 (alleging that Snapchat “violated the provisions of the
Federal Trade Commission Act”). Although Snapchat is not a cloud storage
service, it does retain unviewed messages on its own servers for “30 days.”
SNAPCHAT
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
GUIDE
6
(2015),
SNAPCHAT,
https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf. In that
sense Snapchat resembles a cloud provider. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 27
(“In one form or another, cloud computing services store bits of information on
behalf of their customers.”).
238. See Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 at 2
(“Snapchat marketed its application as a service for sending ‘disappearing’
photo and video messages, declaring that the message sender ‘control[s] how
long your friends can view your message.’”).
239. Id. at 3.
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was misleading. 240 There were in fact “several methods . . . by
which a recipient [could] use tools outside of the application to
save both photo and video messages, allowing the recipient to
access and view the photos or videos indefinitely.” 241 As a result,
the FTC ordered Snapchat to rectify the way it represented itself
to the public. 242
Similarly, cloud storage users have no real way of knowing
whether their property rights are being effectively exercised. 243 A
user can command her cloud storage provider to do many things,
including delete the digital property she has entrusted to it. 244
She cannot, however, verify that her commands have taken effect;
she must simply have faith that her storage service has provided
an accurate picture of the server (or servers) where the data are
actually being stored. 245 Digital property law cannot, and should
not, rest on such opaque foundations. 246

240. See id. at 4 (charging Snapchat with making “false or misleading”
representations).
241. Id. at 3.
242. See Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 at
2 (ordering that Snapchat “shall not misrepresent in any manner, expressly or
by implication, in or affecting commerce, the extent to which . . . its products or
services maintain and protect the privacy, security, or confidentiality of any
covered information”) The order defined “covered information” broadly to
include “any communications or content that is transmitted or stored through
[Snapchat’s] products or services.” Id.
243. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (“A permanent deletion might make a file
or account disappear from the user’s view, but there’s no telling what happens
to the file behind the scenes.”).
244. See
Secure
Access
Control
for
Cloud
Storage,
IBM,
http://www.research.ibm.com/haifa/projects/storage/cloudstorage/secure_access.s
html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (explaining how users manage their clouds) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (observing that deleted data might “still
exist on the primary servers” or “might actually be deleted in some places, but
still exist in others”).
246. The “importance of clarity in property rights” cannot be overstated.
Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1780 n.174
(2011).
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C. The Need for a Solution
At this point, one might interject—why does all this matter?
No one, after all, is forced to use cloud storage. Digital property
owners are merely making a tradeoff: more convenience for less
control. Isn’t the answer to the problem to just simply forego the
cloud altogether?
That solution, frankly, is no solution at all. The cloud is not a
passing fad; it is the future of data storage, a future rapidly
encroaching upon the present. 247 Furthermore, as Part III
explained, many consumers are not even aware that they are
participants in the cloud computing market. 248 Demanding that
consumers choose between the cloud and property rights today is
no different than demanding consumers choose between
telephone networks and privacy rights decades ago. In Katz v.
United States, 249 the Supreme Court clearly rejected that
position. 250 Notably, the Court emphasized “the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication” 251
and overturned a case it decided nearly four decades earlier. 252
Perhaps the passage of time between the two cases accounted for
the Court’s evolved view in applying old law to new technology.
But we cannot wait decades; we have already entered the age of
247. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text (discussing the
widespread and rapid adoption of cloud computing among individuals and
businesses). Indeed, a recently released mobile device is “more tightly integrated
with the cloud than just about any other smartphone, and the creators promise
it will change the way we think about managing files on our tiny pocket
computers.” Chris Velazco, Nextbit Robin Review: This Ambitious ‘Cloud Phone’
is
Beautiful
but
Flawed,
ENGADGET
(Nov.
11,
2016),
http://www.engadget.com/2016/02/18/ nextbit-robin-review (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
248. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing automatic cloud
backup features on certain mobile devices).
249. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
250. See id. at 359 (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” applied to conversations made over public
telephones).
251. Id. at 352.
252. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding “the
wires beyond [a person’s] house and messages while passing over them are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment”).
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the cloud. 253 Therefore, an actual solution—beyond simply
abandoning cloud computing—is needed now.
V. Reclaiming the Right to Destroy
The problems discussed in Part IV are not limited to one
particular context, but they tend to arise when people desire and
make efforts to delete data that they have stored on the cloud. 254
Therefore, the answer ought to lie in reaffirming the property
right most related to that concern: the right to destroy. 255 This
Part will lay out that solution by first explaining why we should
recognize the right to destroy in this emerging context and,
second, how the cloud-maintained digital property owner can
actually exercise this right. 256 It then concludes by briefly
discussing the potential impact of the reaffirmed right to destroy
on digital property governed by license agreements. 257
A. Why We Should
1. Waste and Data
Waste is by far the prevailing justification for restricting the
right to destroy. 258 The core of the argument is that because we
live in a world of limited resources, and because the right to
destroy permits property owners to waste these resources by
destroying them at will, the right to destroy ought to be curtailed
or even eliminated altogether. 259 This sounds reasonable, though
253. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text (discussing the
present ubiquity of cloud computing).
254. See supra Part IV.A–C (noting problems regarding control, peace of
mind, and ethics when cloud users are unable to delete their data maintained on
the cloud with certainty).
255. See supra Part II (discussing the history of the right to destroy as
recognized by Anglo-American law).
256. Infra Part V.A–B.
257. Infra Part V.C.
258. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 821 (observing that “waste avoidance
has been the primary basis for” curtailing the right to destroy).
259. See id. at 796 (noting that “where a living person seeks to destroy her
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the strength of that logic would seem to be dependent on the
uniqueness of the property. 260 But proponents of this “antiwaste
sentiment,” as well as its critics, have thus far considered the
issue only within the context of tangible property. 261 This Note
takes another path. Digital property maintained on the cloud is
“electronic data” and data are inherently “intangible.” 262 There
are several reasons why it does not make sense to apply the
public policy doctrine of waste to such property.
First, there is the chief distinction between digital property
(but not necessarily all intangible property) and tangible
property: replicability. 263 Indeed, every cloud-maintained file is
necessarily a copy because the cloud user has uploaded her files
to the cloud from some local source, be it a mobile device, hard
drive, or any other storage system. 264 Thus, if the owner of a PDF
e-book completely deletes her file, she is merely deleting her copy
of that file. Even if her copy were one of only a few, virtually
anyone possessing another copy of the file could probably create
many, many copies within seconds, at zero cost. 265

property, the courts express concern about the diminution of resources available
to society as a whole”).
260. This is likely why most restrictions of the right to destroy arise in the
context of real property. See id. (observing that “the most prominent set of cases
prompting concerns about waste involve efforts by landowners to destroy their
homes”).
261. See, e.g., id. at 821–22 (defending the right to destroy tangible goods);
McCaffery, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing “waste” as “the dissipation or
destruction of a permanent physical asset”).
262. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital
Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 444 (2005) (noting that “electronic
data . . . are ethereal and intangible, difficult to classify and more difficult to
protect”).
263. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839–42 (discussing the
“copying dilemma that has so hounded online property interests” and observing
that, by contrast, “[i]t is easier to buy a table from someone than to duplicate it
through copying”).
264. See supra Part III.C (discussing the mechanics of cloud storage).
265. See ANANDA MITRA, DIGITAL SECURITY: CYBER TERROR AND CYBER
SECURITY 82 (2010) (noting that it is possible to “make thousands of copies of a
file and distribute them globally for no cost”).
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Conversely, if the owner of a paper book burns it to ashes,
she is burning a one-of-a-kind item. 266 The effect of her act, that
is, the degree of her waste, would depend on a number of
variables, for instance, whether it was a mass-market paperback
or a rare first edition. 267 Even if her book is one of a million
printings, however, she has arguably engaged in waste by leaving
the world with one less resource. Although that cost may be a
fraction of a cent, the ledger recording society’s collective
resources must mark a loss nonetheless—and losses add up.
This rule is admittedly not universal. If the owner of the data
in question is the one who created it, then its deletion could mean
the loss of a unique resource. For instance, when a person takes a
picture on her smartphone, the file initially exists just on that
particular device (assuming a backup is not automatically stored
in the cloud). 268 Yet this is the exception that proves the rule:
antiwaste thought has never gone so far as to argue the creator of
a thing lacks the right to destroy it. 269 That brings us to the
second point: digital property stored on the cloud by individuals
tends to be generated by the cloud user herself. 270 As waste is a
“societal concern,” 271 it would be difficult to justify curtailing the

266. See PETER TOREN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPUTER CRIMES
§ 1.06 (2003) (“Prior to the digitization of information, copying was possible but
it was time-consuming, expensive, and . . . not very efficient.”); Don E.
Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual Property on the
Information Superhighway: The Challenge of the Digital Domain, 6 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 61, 64 (1994) (“Unlike a book, anything traveling on the information
superhighway can be ‘perfect-copy’ captured . . . .”).
267. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 792–94 (noting the relationship
between waste and value).
268. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing cloud storage
services that backup users’ data automatically).
269. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 830–35 (discussing “strong reasons to
defer to the destructive wishes of those who have created cultural property,
particularly when that property has not been published or publicly displayed”).
270. See, e.g., One Thing Is Clear: People Love the Cloud, VERIZON,
https://www.verizonwireless.com/archive/mobile-living/tech-smarts/how-peopleuse-cloud-storage (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (noting that most individual cloud
users use it for personal files such as pictures) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
271. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785.
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right to destroy cloud-maintained data when only the digital
property’s owner is affected by its deletion.
Finally, it may actually be prudent to destroy digital property
stored on the cloud. Data, as a practical matter, is difficult to
control. 272 The burglar who steals something tangible has in her
possession nothing more than that single tangible thing. By
contrast, the hacker who steals digital property, such as an
embarrassing image file, could instantly upload the data to the
internet and thereby allow thousands of copies to fall into
thousands of proverbial hands. 273 If the former theft is a single
flame—still capable of burning, but manageable—the latter is a
California wildfire. 274 The question, then, is how to prevent this
potential conflagration.
There is no foolproof method. Security risks are always
present when data and the internet collide, as with cloud
storage. 275 Nevertheless, the power to delete is an essential
safeguard against such risks; if the owner of a cloud-maintained
file wants to be sure that the world will never see it, her only
option is to delete it. 276 Consider the legal profession: the reason
272. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 62–64 (discussing the
difficulty of controlling data on the internet); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234
(“Once information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not
impossible, to control, track, or delete.”).
273. See, e.g., Duke, supra note 215 (discussing a “hacker’s invasion of
dozens of celebrity iCloud accounts, leading to the embarrassing leaking of nude
photos”).
274. Some have termed this phenomenon the “Streisand effect.” See Justin
Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Because “[t]he ease of sharing now
almost means that nothing can really be suppressed,” attempts to suppress
leaked photos, for example, lead to those photos being copied and shared even
further. Id.
275. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 140 (2015) (“In any security
situation, there’s a basic arms race between attack and defense. One side might
have an advantage for a while . . . [but] then it changes back.”). Schneier notes
that, at present, “both on the Internet and with computers in general, the
attacker has the advantage.” Id. at 141.
276. See, e.g., How to Stop Compromising Pictures of You Being Published
Online, DMCA, http://www.dmca.com/FAQ/How-to-stop-compromising-picturesof-you-being-published-online (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (instructing internet
users to “make sure” that files are deleted to prevent them from being
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lawyers sometimes put clients’ files through a shredder is not
necessarily because they are obligated to do so, but because it is
difficult to keep track of that file for a long period of time and
thereby ensure it does not fall into improper hands. 277 Similarly,
the only way to ensure that data does not reach the wrong person
is to delete it. 278 Thus, the owner who destroys her cloudmaintained digital property is not only not being wasteful; she is
being vigilant.
2. The Value of Deleting
It is not enough to show that antiwaste policies are
inapplicable to cloud-maintained digital property; the right to
delete such property must have some value in itself. Professor
Strahilevitz’s article, discussed throughout this Note, offers
several justifications for the right to destroy generally. 279 For
example, the right to destroy incentivizes prolific figures to
preserve their thoughts on paper 280 and permits artists to engage
“published online for all to see”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). As one expert advises: “Any data you serve up to the cloud can be
stored out there indefinitely, no matter how hard you try to delete it, so give
careful consideration before sending sensitive information into the void.”
Sheldon, supra note 202.
277. See Jay G. Foonberg, Preservation of Files: To Destroy or Not to Destroy,
in THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING, MERGING, AND CLOSING A LAW
PRACTICE 171, 171–72 (Sarina A. Butler & Richard G. Paszkiet eds., 2008) (“File
maintenance, closing, and destruction should be part of an in-place system in
the law practice of every lawyer. . . . Without a file closing and destruction
system in place, the lawyer or firm becomes a permanent unpaid warehouse
service or bailee for the file.”).
278. See Ash Mayfield, Comment, Decrypting the Code of Ethics: The
Relationship Between an Attorney’s Ethical Duties and Network Security, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 547, 600 (2007) (“Sometimes an attorney may need to
permanently delete confidential data.”); supra note 276 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of data deletion).
279. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 808–21, 824–38 (discussing instances
when “society” should “allow someone to remove a valuable, durable asset from
the marketplace”).
280. See id. at 814 (noting that when someone “anticipates that at a later
date he will be able to decide whether to destroy an embarrassing, revealing, or
controversial document, he will be more likely to create and save it in the first
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in an important form of expression. 281 Moreover, in opposition to
the criticism, Professor Strahilevitz contends that the right to
destroy can even serve public policy, observing that “public policy
rationales that seem plain in one era evaporate during
another.” 282
This Note shall again take another path. The right to destroy
is valuable because of its relationship to an owner’s control over
her property. 283 History reveals that this conception of the right is
not entirely new. 284 In Ancient Rome, for example, recognition of
the right to destroy provided a necessary premise in the syllogism
securing property rights, which in turn secured control over
property. 285 Likewise, the right to destroy recognized by the
common law of England made clear that an owner’s property
rights were absolute. 286 As the issues discussed in Part IV all
arise from an owner’s lack of control over her cloud-maintained
data, 287 it is this justification of the right to destroy that gives the
right value in the context of cloud computing.
place”).
281. See id. at 824 (“Because the destruction of a wooden cross, an American
flag, or a draft card conveys an obvious political or social message, courts
contemplating property destruction in the First Amendment context generally
have proved sympathetic to the interests of the destroyers.”).
282. Id. at 799. Discussing Eyerman, Strahilevitz notes that “[a]
homeowner’s gift of open space in a built-up neighborhood might seem like an
act of generosity, not capriciousness, to the modern reader.” Id. at 799–800.
283. See supra notes 23, 197–201 and accompanying text (discussing
property rights as granting an owner control over property).
284. See supra Part II.A–B (addressing the history of the right to destroy).
285. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785–86 (“Under Roman
law . . . destruction functioned as the most extreme recognized property right, so
the owner who could destroy his property necessarily had the right to use it in
less extreme fashions.”). The logic, somewhat restated, is this: An owner has the
right to destroy her property. To destroy property is to exceed merely using it,
transferring it, or excluding it from others. Therefore, if the owner has a right to
destroy, she must necessarily have those lesser rights.
286. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223–24 (explaining that “if
a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit whatever waste
his own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable or
accountable for it to any one”). Blackstone, as discussed, viewed English
property rights as absolute. See supra Part II.B (discussing the right to destroy
developed through English common law).
287. See supra Part IV.A (discussing an owner’s lack of control over her data
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The power to delete serves unique purposes in the age of
digital property. 288 The right to destroy has been called “an
extreme right to control subsequent alienation,” 289 but when it
comes to cloud-maintained data, destruction might be the only
means of controlling subsequent alienation. Recall the
hypothetical discussed in this Note’s introduction. 290 The owner of
a photograph can control subsequent alienation in several ways.
By simply possessing it, she necessarily prevents others from
possessing it. 291 By keeping it in her home, she can generally
control who uses it. By handing it to a friend, she can be sure that
the friend receives it. Finally, by burning it, she can be sure that
no one will ever possess it, use it, or transfer it again. 292
These methods are unavailable to the owner of a digital
picture stored on the cloud. She may possess the file, in the sense
that she can access it, but this does not prevent others from
possessing it. 293 Indeed, the cloud storage provider clearly
possesses it, thereby placing “subsequent alienation” more or less
in its hands. 294 The owner may be able to set permissions as to
maintained on the cloud).
288. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF
FORGETTING (2009) (discussing the dangers of “everlasting digital memory”).
289. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794.
290. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text (illustrating how
destroying a tangible photograph differs from deleting a digital picture, which in
turn differs from attempting to delete a digital picture maintained on the cloud).
291. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 864–65 (“If person A holds
a rivalrous resource, person B does not.”). Although not universally so,
“traditional personal property” is both “rival and tangible.” Id. at 865.
292. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (noting that “by destroying [property],
I permanently exclude third parties from using it . . . . I use it up . . . [and]
prevent it from ever being resold or used in a manner that displeases [me]”).
293. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2334 (“Cloud account holders can share
their materials with other account holders, and more than one person can use
the same account from different locations.”)
294. See, e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.
com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2017) (last
visited Mar. 6, 2017) (providing that “Apple may, without liability to you, access,
use, preserve and/or disclose your Account information and Content to law
enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or a third party, as Apple
believes is reasonably necessary or appropriate”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Apple defines “Content” broadly to include “music,
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who can access the file on the cloud, 295 but she cannot ensure
these commands will be heeded. 296 In other words, while the
owner of the tangible photograph can simply hand it over to a
friend, the owner of the cloud-maintained digital picture must
ask the cloud storage service to give her friend access and at the
same time trust the service to not grant access to any other. What
was once a straightforward transaction becomes roundabout in
the world of the cloud.
That is why the right to destroy is valuable. If recognized,
and properly enforced, 297 the right will allow the cloud user to
fully control her data, because destruction is unequivocal;
actually deleting digital property is the same as actually
destroying tangible property. 298 It is true that the nature of cloud
computing makes it difficult for the owner of digital property to
govern who can access it, possess it, and use it. 299 With respect to
such property, however, the right to destroy can not only evince
the existence of these less extreme property rights, 300 but secure
them as well. 301
The right to destroy is also necessary to secure an
ever-increasing concern of the twenty-first century: privacy. 302
graphics, photographs, images, sounds, videos, [and] messages.” Id.
295. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2334 (discussing how cloud users can share
their files with others).
296. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cloud
user’s lack of control over her cloud-maintained data and specifically an
instance where “Dropbox mishandled access permissions to files stored on its
servers”).
297. See infra Part V.B (explaining how we can reaffirm the right to
destroy).
298. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing methods of effective deleting electronic
data).
299. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 202, at 295–96 (including the uncertainty
of “ownership and control of online data” among “concerns that create barriers
to wider acceptance of cloud computing”).
300. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788 (discussing the view that if an
owner has “the right to destroy property, he certainly [has] the right to use or
dispose of it in a less dramatic manner”).
301. See supra notes 272–278 and accompanying text (explaining why cloud
users must have the ability to delete data as a matter of prudence).
302. See SCHNEIER, supra note 275, at 125–34 (discussing the dangers of
“mass surveillance . . . being done by algorithms”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at
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Destruction, after all, is the ultimate security measure. 303
Shredders do not exist because people enjoy seeing paper
transformed to confetti; they exist because people need a way to
ensure that written information remains private. 304 In that
respect, digital property is no different. As a data security tool,
the power to delete is critical because it is the best means of
ensuring data remain private. 305
B. How We Can
1. Securing the Right
Although the law may disfavor the right to destroy, the right
itself is not dead; yet, it lives merely as an implicit right. 306 This
is not an ideal state of things with respect to the cloud, which is
itself plagued by uncertainty. 307 After all, property rights hold
786 (noting that “protecting the right to destroy can enhance social welfare by
protecting privacy”).
303. See, e.g., Mayfield, supra note 278, at 573 (noting that “an attorney
must shred files that contain confidential information before they are deposited
in the trash”); Beth Givens, Prevent Identity Theft with Responsible
Information-Handling Practices in the Workplace, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE
(Mar. 1, 2004), https://www.privacyrights.org/blog/prevent-identity-theftresponsible-information-handling-practices-workplace (last updated June 2009)
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing the importance of ensuring destruction to
data privacy and security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
304. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 813 (noting that “presidents and other
public officials” do not destroy their private papers “irrationally,” but “to protect
their privacy and the privacy of their associates”).
305. See, e.g., MICROSOFT, PROTECTING DATA AND PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 10
(2014), http://goo.gl/WbJFT2 (noting that data are deleted so “customers’ data
privacy is maintained”); Secure Deletion Guideline, U.C. BERKELEY,
http://security.berkeley.edu/secure-deletion-guideline (last visited Mar. 6, 2017)
(“Resource Custodians must ensure [the deletion of files because] . . . [s]torage
media are prone to physical theft and loss [and u]nauthorized parties can
acquire unencrypted data stored on the device.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
306. See supra Part II.D (discussing the present state of the right to
destroy).
307. See supra notes 202–206, 225–230 and accompanying text (observing
the cloud user’s lack of control and the ambivalence of cloud storage terms of
service agreements).
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little meaning unless they are “secured by clear laws.” 308 The
right to destroy must thus be both acknowledged and explicitly
recognized by the law if owners are to regain control of their
cloud-maintained digital property.
Property rights, generally speaking, are creatures of common
law. 309 An owner does not acquire a “bundle of rights” in her
property by statute. 310 Indeed, possessing, using, excluding, and
transferring property are so bound up with the idea of ownership
that it is difficult imagining an Anglo-American system of
property without those rights. 311 In that sense, the right to
destroy is a bit of an anomaly. Many courts consider it a less
important right and some have not hesitated to restrict it. 312
Legal commentators, meanwhile, attack the right while leaving
the others in the bundle unscathed. 313 Furthermore, the long
history of the right does not change the fact that property owners
rarely destroy their valuable property. 314 The product of these
factors is that courts may be more inclined to eschew common law
tradition when it comes to the right to destroy. 315
308. Property
Rights,
2017
INDEX
ECON.
FREEDOM,
http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. See, e.g., Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT.
L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) (“Common law principles are the primary source of
property law.”).
310. See id. at 257 (discussing “the bundle of rights and the common law
property rules that make up the bundle in each state”).
311. See id. at 268 (noting that property rights “are so much a part of the
American psyche” that “[t]hese rights have been bound up with the preservation
of private property and landed interests from the revolution forward”).
312. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing cases limiting the right to destroy).
313. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that Black’s Law
Dictionary removed references to the right to destroy from its definition of
“owner,” but retained “the right[s] to possess, use, and convey something”);
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing scholarly works advocating for limitations of the
right to destroy).
314. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (observing that owners destroy
valuable property rarely and that even though “[l]ess valuable kinds of property
are destroyed all the time, . . . the low stakes involved . . . keep any resulting
disagreements out of the courts”).
315. See id. at 852 (concluding that “[t]he recent trend in American law has
been to curtail property owners’ traditional rights to destroy their own
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However, the caselaw limiting the right to destroy concerns
tangible, usually real property; 316 scholarly condemnation of the
right to destroy arises predominantly in the context of waste; 317
and the (attempted) deletion of data is far more commonplace
than the destruction of property in the physical world. 318 Courts
should acknowledge that digital property maintained in the cloud
falls outside the scope of the classic right to destroy
jurisprudence 319 and accordingly construe precedents restricting
the right to destroy narrowly. They should then look towards the
common law, where they will find the long recognized right to
destroy. 320 The concept of cloud storage may be new, but the right
to destroy is not. 321 As this Note has made clear, the truth is
quite the opposite. 322 Courts would thus be fully justified in
relying on a traditional right derived from the common law to
solve this twenty-first century problem.
The best feature of this solution is that it is both simple and
readily implementable. 323 Courts, as discussed above, need only
consult the long history of the right to destroy, recognize that
precedents restricting it are inapplicable to data stored on the
cloud, and, accordingly, affirm that the owner of cloudmaintained digital property has the right to delete it. Although
property”).
316. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the common contexts of right to
destroy cases).
317. See supra Parts II.C.2, V.A.1 (noting that waste avoidance is the
“prevailing justification” for efforts to limit the right to destroy).
318. Compare supra notes 272–278 and accompanying text (discussing why
owners ought to destroy digital property), with Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794
(noting that a property owner is not likely to want to destroy her valuable
property).
319. See supra Part V.A.1 (arguing that waste concerns are far less
pronounced in the digital property context).
320. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (observing that the right to
destroy is “a long-recognized right of property owners”).
321. See id. at 787–88 (discussing the right to destroy “in antiquity”).
322. See supra Part II.A (tracing the early history of the right to destroy).
323. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual
Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 466 (2008) [hereinafter
Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts] (noting that “the common law is an
immediately available tool to solve problems related to emerging technologies”).
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there do not seem to be any instances of courts ordering
destruction for the purpose of respecting an owner’s right to
destroy her property, 324 courts frequently order the destruction of
property, as well as the deletion of intangibles, in other
contexts. 325 Moreover, as Chief Justice Marshall famously stated
over two centuries ago, “it is a general and indisputable rule that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law whenever that right is invaded.” 326 What is a
property right if not a legal right?
The alternative solution would be to secure the right by
statute. 327 It is true that a positive law that spells out in clear
terms (1) that owners of cloud-maintained digital property have
the right to delete their data and (2) what cloud providers must
do to ensure its deletion would definitively secure the right
discussed above. Indeed, in the best of worlds, such a statute
would be a good thing. But there are a number of difficulties with
this approach.
First, it is not readily implementable. 328 If we were to rely
solely on statutory law, cloud users seeking to ensure the
destruction of their cloud-maintained digital property would be
without recourse until such a time as when the statute is
enacted. Hence, the second disadvantage: the lawmaking process
324. This should not be surprising, given that ownership rights and
possession of the property have historically gone hand in hand. See, e.g., O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 241 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (“The
consequences attached to possession are substantially those attached to
ownership . . . .”). Thus the owner could readily exercise her right to destroy
without the need for judicial recourse.
325. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 395
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Defendant [shall] destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings
that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without
Plaintiffs’ authorization and destroy all copies of those downloaded recordings
transferred onto any physical medium or device in Defendant’s possession,
custody, or control.”).
326. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
327. See Johnson, supra note 309, at 248 (“Property law comes from three
sources: the common law, statutes, and the Constitution.”).
328. See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 323, at 465–68
(discussing the comparative advantages of common law over law legislatures
develop).
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is sluggish. 329 Years, if not decades, could go by before cloud users
obtain the right to delete cloud-maintained data. Finally, it is
unclear what the statute would actually look like. One can only
imagine the series of debates regarding the purpose, scope, and
enforcement of this hypothetical law. 330 Perhaps we could look
internationally for inspiration, where the concept of a “right to
delete” has gained much traction in the data-privacy context. 331
This idea, however, has apparently fallen on deaf ears in the
United States; it “is the only Western country without basic data
protection laws.” 332 Moreover, legislatures have historically been
unreliable in the field of digital property. 333 If Congress has yet to
act in these arenas, can it really be expected to act when it comes
to the right to delete cloud-maintained data?
This is not to say a statute enshrining the right to destroy
cloud-maintained data is unwanted. Quite the contrary, a
congressional enactment would clearly cement the legitimacy of
the common law right to destroy. But, for better or worse, we “live
in a common law regime.” 334 A statute, therefore, is not needed.
Anglo-American law once recognized the right to destroy as
fundamental 335 and it should do the same today. Once courts, for
the reasons noted above, recognize the right to destroy in the new
context of cloud-maintained digital property, cloud users will
finally be able to wrest control over their data from the hands of
cloud providers.

329. See Gary Lawson, Judicial Supremacy Today: Interpretative Equality
as a Structural Imperative (Or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 379, 382 (2003) (“The lawmaking process is slow, cumbersome, and
difficult.”).
330. See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 323, at 466–67 (noting
that “technology legislation is infamous for creating unforeseen consequences”
and that such legislation “is often sweeping”).
331. See SCHNEIER, supra note 275, at 200–03 (discussing the data
protection laws of the European Union).
332. Id. at 200.
333. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1091–92 (discussing
why “there is little reason to think that the United States will reach an effective
legislative solution to the virtual property problem”).
334. Id. at 1091.
335. See supra Part II.B (discussing the right to destroy at common law).
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2. Enforcing the Right
It is one thing to secure the right to destroy by law; it is
another to be able to actually execute that right. The chief
impediment in that respect is the sheer resiliency of data. 336 In
other words, the question is whether cloud-maintained digital
property is even capable of deletion. Strictly speaking, the answer
is no. 337 As observed at the outset of this Note, the only way to
absolutely guarantee the destruction of a file is to destroy the
physical device containing it. 338 Physical destruction, however, is
no solution for the cloud user. After all, the servers do not belong
to her in the first place. 339 It would be patently unreasonable to
demand that Google, for example, smash one of its servers to bits
to ensure the deletion of another’s file taking up a tiny fraction of
the server’s space. Therefore, we must define “destroy” more
broadly to encompass the effective deletion of data.
One method of effectively deleting data is by overwriting
it. 340 In fact, data cannot even be considered deleted unless it is
overwritten because simply deleting a file “just makes the file
336. See NAT’L COMPUT. SEC. CTR., A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING DATA
REMANENCE
IN
AUTOMATED
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
1
(1991),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=A
DA393188 (noting that “[d]ata remanence is the residual physical
representation of data that has been in some way erased” and discussing “the
role data remanence plays when storage media is erased”).
337. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 26, at 46 (“Deleting files is so difficult that
only extreme measures may work.”); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234 (“Once
information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible,
to control, track, or delete.”).
338. See Krause, supra note 26, at 46 (quoting an expert as stating that
“[t]he only way to completely erase a hard drive is to take it out of the computer
and smash it with a hammer”).
339. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 14 (recognizing that using the cloud
entails using “the database storage facilities of a third party”); supra Part III.C
(providing an overview of cloud storage).
340. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., http://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-delete-your-data-securelywindows (last updated Mar. 5, 2015) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“The best way to
delete a file forever . . . is to make sure it gets overwritten immediately, in a way
that makes it difficult to retrieve what used to be written there.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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invisible” and marks the space it once occupied as available. 341
Overwriting a file may not guarantee its obliteration, 342 but it is
generally accepted that overwritten data cannot be recovered. 343
Thus, to ensure the destruction of cloud-maintained digital
property, cloud providers should immediately overwrite data
marked for deletion with new or even existing data. Given the
sheer volume of data stored on the cloud, 344 this should not be a
problem.
There is a problem, however, in that overwriting is only
effective for traditional, magnetic-based storage like hard disk
drives (HDDs). 345 Today, most companies operating server
farms—such as cloud storage providers—have upgraded to solidstate drives (SSDs), which are based on flash memory. 346 There
341. Id.
342. See Daniel Feenberg, Can Intelligence Agencies Read Overwritten
Data?, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (July 21, 2003), http://www.nber.org/sysadmin/overwritten-data-gutmann.html (last modified Mar. 24, 2004) (last
visited Mar. 6, 2017) (acknowledging “that overwritten bits might be observable
under certain circumstances”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
343. See id. (arguing that overwritten data are generally inaccessible);
RICHARD KISSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA
SANITIZATION
7
(2014),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
(reporting that “a single overwrite . . . typically hinders recovery of data even if
state of the art laboratory techniques are applied to attempt to retrieve the
data”).
344. See CISCO, CISCO GLOBAL CLOUD INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY,
2015–2020, at 13 (2015), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/
service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.pdf (reporting
“per-user traffic” of cloud storage at “513 MB per month in 2015” and
forecasting “1.7 Gigabytes (GB) per month by 2020”).
345. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340
(providing instructions on how to overwrite data, but noting that the
instructions “apply only to traditional disk drives”).
346. See Cade Metz, Flash Drives Replace Disks at Amazon, Face-Book,
Dropbox, WIRED (June 13, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/flashdata-centers (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Dropbox is running servers equipped
with solid-state drives . . . . Such names as Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft,
Mozilla, and Wikia are also using solid-state storage in their data centers, and
judging from anecdotal evidence, the trend goes even further.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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are numerous distinctions between HDDs and SSDs, 347 but
relevant here is the fact that overwriting does little to secure the
deletion of data stored on the latter kind of device. 348 As a result,
“it is difficult, if not impossible, to securely delete both individual
files and free space” from SSDs. 349
So is the right to delete digital property stored in the cloud a
moot point? Not at all. Data stored on solid-state drives can still
be effectively deleted through encryption. 350 This approach entails
using “a cryptographic key to encrypt and decrypt incoming and
outgoing data” 351 and deleting the key to “effectively sanitiz[e] the
data by preventing read-access.” 352 In other words, the digital
files are locked and can only be accessed through a key; throw
away the key and they are essentially rendered inaccessible. 353
Then they can be overwritten or otherwise deleted with little
worry. 354 Even if the files have not truly vanished, they cannot be
347. See, e.g., Brendan Hesse, Solid State Drives vs. Hard Drives: Which Is
Right
for
You?,
DIGITAL
TRENDS
(June
26,
2015),
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304083634/http://www.digitaltrends.com/comp
uting/solid-state-drives-vs-hard-disk-drives (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(discussing the “pros and cons of both technologies”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
348. See MICHAEL WEI ET AL., RELIABLY ERASING DATA FROM FLASH-BASED
SOLID STATE DRIVES 1 (2011), https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/fast11/tech/
full_papers/Wei.pdf
(“Single-file
sanitization
[or
data
erasing]
techniques . . . consistently fail to remove data from the SSD.”). Although
“overwriting the entire disk twice [is] sufficient to sanitize the disk,” id. at 6, for
obvious reasons cloud storage providers cannot be required to overwrite an
entire solid-state drive to conform with a cloud user’s request to delete her data,
which will typically take up a small fraction of it.
349. How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340; see also
WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 7 (“None of the [single-file overwriting] protocols
tested successfully sanitized the SSDs or the USB drive in all cases.”).
350. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 2 (“An alternative approach to
overwriting or otherwise obliterating bits is to cryptographically sanitize
storage.”).
351. Id.
352. Kissel et al., supra note 343, at 9.
353. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 6 (“[D]eleting the encryption key will,
in theory, render the data on the drive irretrievable.”).
354. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340
(observing that “even if the file is still on the disk, it will at least look like
gibberish to anyone who gets ahold of it”).
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accessed and thus cannot be used, alienated, or controlled in any
meaningful sense, assuaging the concerns underlying the right to
destroy. 355 Although this method is not foolproof, 356 it is the best
means available to cloud users seeking to properly enforce their
legal right to delete digital property stored on the cloud. 357
C. One Caveat: The Trouble with Terms
Up until this point we have discussed the right to destroy
digital property with the assumption that the one seeking to
exercise that right owns the property. But as a result of long,
complex, and almost universally unread agreements, much of
what we consider to be “our” digital property—from eBooks to
MP3s to video games—is not sold to us, but licensed. 358
One subset of such licensed digital property that might be
called virtual property best demonstrates this “terms of use”
problem. 359 Such property may only “exist” within a specific
virtual world, but there are nevertheless markets wherein the
virtual property can be exchanged for real-world money. 360 This is
despite the fact it is almost universally the creator of the virtual
355. See supra notes 23, 200 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between the right to destroy and an owner’s control over her
property).
356. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 6 (noting the disadvantages of
sanitizing data through encryption and concluding that “it is unduly optimistic
to assume that SSD vendors will properly sanitize the key store”).
357. See supra Part V.A (arguing that the right to destroy should encompass
the right to delete cloud-maintained data).
358. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839 (observing that
“[p]roperty rights in digital copies of copyrighted material” are typically subject
to “end user license agreements”); Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions:
Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 149,
162 n.68 (2010) (noting that Amazon Kindle “license terms prevent buyers from
actually owning [e-]books” and discussing the bevy of restrictions and terms
found in the “iTunes EULA”).
359. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1050 (arguing that
“holders of intellectual property rights have been systematically eliminating
emerging virtual property rights by the use of contracts”).
360. See id. at 1061 (“Within virtual environments, virtual objects of all
types change hands for real money.”).
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world, as opposed to the individual who buys, sells, trades, and
uses the virtual property, who owns the virtual property. 361
Therein lies the rub: if we simply reaffirm and reinforce the right
to destroy in the current digital landscape, 362 those who use,
trade, buy, and sell various virtual assets will be unprotected
from the actual owner of the property’s exercise of the right. Is
there any way to avoid this pitfall?
This leads us to an issue every discussion of the right to
destroy must inevitably address: whether the right should be
absolute. Even the most ardent defenders of the right to destroy,
however, do not argue for an absolute right. 363 This Note is no
exception. Although waste is of little concern in the digital
property context, 364 for the reasons discussed above, the right to
destroy ought to be limited with respect to digital property
secured through licensing agreements. 365
This caveat to the solution offered in Part V.B can likewise
be achieved through the common law. 366 Courts should recognize
a new public policy exception for the right to destroy with respect
to virtual property. This would not be unprecedented. 367 Courts
limiting the right to destroy have typically done so on the basis of
how the destruction of a particular piece of property would affect
361. See id. at 1063 (“Although hundreds of millions of dollars change hands
annually for virtual houses, chairs, money, clothes, or the like, . . . rights in
virtual property are either not enforced, or are expressly prohibited by the
creator of the virtual environment, who holds the intellectual property interest
in the environment itself.”).
362. See supra Part V.A–B (arguing why and how courts should recognize
the right to destroy).
363. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785, 796–803 (concluding that
“the right to destroy should [not] be absolute” and “identify[ing] a few contexts
and considerations in which restrictions on the destruction of property are
highly desirable”).
364. Supra Part V.A.1.
365. For simplicity and brevity, this Note will refer to such property as
“virtual property.”
366. See supra notes 323–335 and accompanying text (arguing for a common
law solution to the problem of being unable to reliably delete cloud-maintained
digital property).
367. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing caselaw exceptions to the right to
destroy).
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someone other than the owner. 368 That is exactly the basis for
this proposed exception. In the case of virtual property, a virtual
world provider that deletes the virtual property it holds
intellectual rights to is far less affected by that act than the user
of the virtual property who has potentially invested time, money,
or even other virtual goods into it. 369 While sweeping limitations
on the right to destroy ought to be generally discouraged, when
ownership becomes a “strange amalgam[] of contract, licensing,
and pseudoproperty law,” 370 the right must be more carefully
construed.
VI. Conclusion
Today, most of us are digital property owners, whether we
make movies with our Samsung Galaxy or dictate notes to Siri or
simply take “selfies” on the latest smart device. Tomorrow, cloud
storage will be the primary—if not default—way we maintain
such property. This is not a bad thing in itself. The convenience of
being able to access our videos, writings, photographs, and other
kinds of digital property no matter where we are or what
equipment we are using is nothing short of amazing. But even if
technology marches on, that is no reason to let property rights
fall by the wayside. We cannot allow a fundamental underpinning
of property ownership—control—to be swept up in the cloud.
The severance of control from possession is a uniquely
modern problem stemming from what seems like a perfect storm
of technological developments. Yet, somewhat ironically, it
highlights the advantages of our old but adaptable common law
system. As proposed by this Note, we can solve this problem by
affirmatively reaffirming and reinforcing the right to destroy. As
the foregoing discussion makes clear, this solution is both
368. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (refusing to enforce a testator’s will provision to raze her house because
“[d]estruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally affects the
community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the estate and is
without benefit to the dead woman”).
369. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1062 (observing “the
amount of current investment and interest in virtual worlds”).
370. Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 810.
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desirable and feasible. All that is required is to implement it. By
doing so, owners of digital property maintained in the cloud will
be able to exert the same rights property law promises to owners
of tangible property existing in the real world.
The right to destroy is not just an ancient concept or a relic of
common law to be tossed aside in favor of a more “enlightened”
framework of property. 371 It is a right newly relevant, and wholly
adaptable, to the modern system of digital property. It can and
should become the right to delete—the right to disperse the cloud.

371. Cf. McCaffery, supra note 14, at 81 (referring to the right to destroy as
“an embarrassment in Anglo-American law”).

